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READINGS IN SOCIOLOGY

VOL. I

SOCIAL EVOLUTION

EDITED BY .

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PREFACE

Nothing has been so recklessly abused and so grossly misunderstood as the term *Social Science*, as it is taken now in our country. It seems as though many people look on this term as synonymous with the *most radical socialism*, with which, however, it has no kinship whatever except in the linguistic genealogy of "Social."

Social Science means nothing but the technique of the scientific study of social phenomena, or the scientific investigation of human social life; hence law, politics, economics, history, anthropology, ethnology, psychology, sociology, comparative philology, and anthropo-geography—these are its typical categories.

This series of readings is intended primarily for the use of the English classes in higher schools, but due care has been exercised to present in a harmonious unity only those materials that may be suitably adopted from well-recognized authorities in the respective fields. Thus it is hoped that it may serve, at the same time, for the use of the classes in sociology and other branches of social science in the study of original English materials.

To make the books readable as well as logically consistent, selections have been made from a large number of authorities—books and periodicals—, and

put together, sometimes partly rewritten, in such a manner that the same chapters and even the same sections frequently consist of materials from several different sources. For this reason, the editor has preferred not to indicate the sources in detail. It would suffice here, for the present purpose, just to mention that this volume contains such authorities as Ratzel, Haddon, Semple, Tylor, Boas, Grosse, Thomas, Hayes, Blackmar and Gillin.

KISABURO KAWABE.

Matsue Koto-Gakko,

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CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. SOCIAL EVOLUTION AND COSMIC EVOLUTION.	I
II. SOCIAL EVOLUTION AND BIOLOGICAL EVOLU- TION	4
III. MAN AND ANIMALS	7
IV. HUMAN SOCIETY AND THE SOCIETY OF ANI- MALS	11
1. The society of Animals.	
2. The Causes of Animal Aggregation.	
3. Kinship and the Consolidation of Groups.	
V. DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN SOCIETY	19
1. The Origin of Language.	
2. Physical Pressure.	
3. Common Ethical Sentiment.	
4. Origin of Public Control.	
5. The Force of war.	
VI. SITUATION AND NUMBERS OF THE HUMAN RACE	32
VII. THE EFFECT OF GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS IN HISTORY	36
1. Man's Relations to Natural Environment.	
2. Along Natural Highways History Repeats Itself.	
3. Physical Environment and Different Stages of Development.	
4. Forces of Land and Sea.	
5. Mountain Regions and Fertile Plains.	
VIII. MENTAL LIFE AND EDUCATION	45
1. Characteristics in Primitive Society.	
2. Organization of Mind Identical among Different Races.	

	3.	Power to Inhibit Impulses.	
	4.	Manifestation of Mind.	
	5.	The Influence of Traditional Material upon the Activities of Man.	
	6.	The Question of Choice as Dependent upon Social Valuation.	
	7.	Mind and Individual Experience.	
IX.	FAMILY LIFE	61
	1.	The Early Forms of Marriage.	
	2.	Various Forms of Marriage.	
	3.	The Psychological Influences in Family Organization, and Social Status of the Family.	
X.	THE STATE	68
	1.	The Origin of the State.	
	2.	Ethnic Basis of the State.	
	3.	The Gentes as Political Units.	
	4.	Prominent Forces in State Building.	
	5.	The Modern Social State.	
XI.	RELIGIOUS LIFE	79
	1.	The Evolution of Religion.	
	2.	Historic Theories of the Origin of Religion.	
	3.	Baldwin's Theory of "Dialectic of Personal Growth," and King's Group Psychological Theory of Religion.	
	4.	Summary of Various Theories.	
	5.	Religion a Strong Factor in Society Building.	
XII.	ART, ORNAMENT, AND DECORATION	94
	1.	Artistic Motives.	
	2.	Stages of Artistic Development.	
	3.	Clothing and Ornament.	
	4.	Ornament as Social Distinction.	
	5.	Objects of Luxury among the Natural Races.	
	6.	Social Control by Means of Art.	
XIII.	CONCLUSION: THE TENDENCY IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION...	112

SOCIAL EVOLUTION

CHAPTER I

SOCIAL EVOLUTION AND COSMIC EVOLUTION

Geologists declare that the earth's crust has been formed for a hundred million years, that the record of slow geologic processes indelibly written in the rocks is at least as old as that. Physicists used to say that the sun could not have shone so long; it would have burned out. But since the discovery of radio-activity the physicists withdraw their objection and say that for anything they know to the contrary the time may have been far longer even than the geologists declare it to have been. Life appeared and began to deposit its remains as soon as the waters of the sea became sufficiently cooled nearly a hundred million years ago. The oldest unmistakably human remains however are only between 200,000 and 500,000 years old. If we should let the width of a man's thumb represent the time that has elapsed since the oldest preserved records of Egypt and Mesopotamia were made, the length of a man's walking stick would proportionally represent the total age of the genus *Homo*, and a line representing the age of the earth's crust would have to be

prolonged down the street for several blocks. As compared with the eons which were required to build this habitation of man, it is only a short time since he moved in, and he has only just now got the use of the conveniences of the establishment.

A few hundred years ago the parents of the English-speaking nations were as savage as the savagest, without temples to their Gods, in perpetual and bloody war, untamed cannibals; add a few thousand years to the perspective, and man over the whole globe was in the same condition. As seen by an intelligence to which a thousand years are as one day the whole period of recorded history has been very brief in comparison with that which every reason leads us to anticipate during the ages through which our sun is likely to shine.

We may not look backward to find our ideals, but rather to gather confidence for further progress by contemplating the whole of the pit whence we were digged and out of which we have climbed. Bacon was right in saying: "We are the true antiquity, that which we call antiquity was the childhood of the race." Apparently ever since men began to grow old and lose the zest and glamour of youth, they have mistakenly lamented the "good old times." Memory and tradition dwell upon that which is picturesque and pleasing, but present experience feels existing evils in all their sharpness. Already in ancient Israel the rebuke was needed: "Say not thou, What is the cause that the former days

were better than these? for thou dost not inquire wisely concerning this."¹ It is said that one of the clay cylinders dug up at Babylon among the oldest of all records of human thought contains a complaint on the decadence of the times.

The common-sense native to man reveals such reaches of time and space as concern his daily actions. He can see as far as he can walk in a day, and he discerns objects as small as he can handle. He can also remember and foresee a little. But the telescope reveals abysses of vastness previously inconceivable; and the microscope and the experiments of the physicists reveal abysses of minuteness as unfathomable; and the study of evolution opens similar vistas of past and coming time. As compared with other students of evolution the sociologist deals with a fresh young world, rich in the prospects of future change.

CHAPTER II

SOCIAL EVOLUTION AND BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION

Organization, in the sense of adjustment of inter-related and interdependent parts so as to maintain a status quo whether of rest or motion, is perhaps the most universal fact of nature. Such organization pervades even the "inorganic" world. The solar system itself is such an organization and such also according to recent teaching are the atoms.

The behavior of the most complex and nicely adjusted organizations we call life. Such living organizations we name "organisms," and their organization is studied by the biologist. Many of the biological organisms feed, reproduce, and protect themselves by uniting into colonies, flocks, or herds. Some of these animals manifest special instincts or inborn tendencies, which promote the correlation of their activities, such as sociability, sympathy, partisanship, anger, dominance, submission, imitation, and emulation. It is hard to draw any but imaginary lines across the continuum of nature, hard to say just how or where life begins or where society first appears. Says Espinas, "If an exact observer should succeed in showing in the relation of plants to each other or in the relations between parts of the same plant any traces of co-operation, we should see no difficulty

in admitting these studies to the body of social science, and do not doubt that one would find that the general principles of the science applied to them." Then stamens and pistils are married and cells are associates. Espinas would not flinch from this logical conclusion. Doubtless the unity of nature is such that the simpler sciences that first came within the compass of the mind afford the light by which later and more complex investigations are made possible, and also that these later studies throw new illumination upon the earlier investigations; and so the study of organization throughout all nature is in a sense one. Yet we must limit our task somewhere; and though we may be aided by the study of organization wherever found, especially the organized groups of lower animals, we will draw the line of definition for our undertaking at the point where *invention* begins to play a conspicuous part in originating the activities that become organized into a self-maintaining functional unity.

Merely trophic congregation and co-operation such as exists among infusoria, and probably such instinctive co-operation as exists among insects result from purely biological evolution. But as soon as psychophysical organisms are sufficiently evolved so that they can do useful or otherwise interesting things that are not exactly prescribed by instinct, can remember and repeat those interesting actions, and can imitate each other in the doing of them, then all the materials are present for the beginning of dis-

tinctively social evolution as distinguished from merely biological evolution. As we have noted, all evolution, biological and inorganic, is social in the sense of organized, correlated, but with the above conditions fulfilled we get the correlation of a new kind of elements, and so a new type of evolution. Of course the instinctive activities, especially the social instincts (sociability, dominance, etc.) continue to play their part in the more complex and higher correlation of activities in which the new elements are involved, just as the higher unities of nature are in general differentiated from the lower, not by the absence of all that had preceded, but by organizing preceding elements with the new elements into a new type of entity. The life of all human societies is rich in invented elements. The maternal instinct is as biological as mammæ, but every human society has an array of socially evolved and communicated practices which are included in the exercise of the maternal function. Many of the animals that hunt in packs or graze in flocks have leaders, but the governmental organization of men includes not only instinctive dominance and submission, but also elements of custom and institution which instinct does not supply.

CHAPTER III

MAN AND ANIMALS

Man is not thought to be descended from any living ape, though both man and the ape had probably a common ancestor. And the lowest savages would not too greatly despise the kinship; indeed the savages are often proud to claim relationship with the animals. During the nine months preceding birth the human organism apparently retraces the course of its evolution. The human embryo at its successive stages resembles first the unicellular protozoan and subsequently the embryos of vermes, fish, amphibian, reptile, and tailed quadruped. The same processes of development which once took thousands of years for their consummation are here condensed, foreshortened, concentrated into the space of weeks. Thus does each man born into the world climb his own genealogical tree. At birth the ascent is not quite complete, for the anatomy of the human infant is adapted to the quadrumanous and not to the erect posture. Even when full-grown, man still has scores of rudimentary organs, which as man he cannot use but which his ancestors have required, such as muscles for pricking up the ears, three to five tail vertebræ, and bands of fibrous tissue which in the human embryo, and in the prehuman ancestor were the tail-wagging

muscles. Man and all the anthropoids most closely allied to him have long since lost their external tails. In certain animals the "blind tube" is as long as the body and of great use in digestion; in the early human embryo it is equal in caliber to the rest of the bowels, but in the orang it is but slightly larger than in man with whom it persists as a shrunken rudiment, the useless and mischief-making vermiform appendix.

In the order of primates the genus *Homo* stands structurally nearer to the old-world apes than the latter do to the apes of South America. Not only is this true as a general statement but, according to Professor Huxley, there is no series of organs in the structure of which man and the higher apes are not nearer to each other than are the higher and the lower apes. It is social evolution that raises man far above the brutes and gives him his human dignity, that clothes him and puts speech in his mouth, and conscience in his breast.

The important differences between man and the Catarrhine apes are correlates of one fact, namely, increased dependence for survival upon brain work. The use of the front limbs, not for supporting the body but for manipulation which is begun by the apes, is a correlate of increasing brain work and brain power. Improvements in the hands are selected for survival when the brain can use the hands. Adjustment to the upright posture, strengthening the lower limbs to bear the whole burden of loco-

tion, diminishing the relative weight of the fore limbs and shortening them so as to manipulate at the present focal distance of the eyes, and the degeneracy of the jaws, no longer selected for the purposes of prehension which the hands have assumed, together with increase of brain mass, are all parts of one correlated change. The excessive lengthening of the arms in apes is an adjustment to the period of transition during which there is frequent alternation between the quadrupedal and bipedal posture.

Social evolution begins among the higher animals, and social co-operation heightens the efficiency of brain work and renders more certain the selection for survival of advantageous brain qualities. Primitive man had not completed the complex change just described; association hastened that change. Each of the least developed human races retains one or more marks of resemblance to the other primates, such as color of skin, thinness of legs, excessive length of arms, bigness of paunch, shortness of stature, prehensile toes, big and protruding jaws, or slightly smaller brain mass.

Although the beginnings of social evolution afford conditions that help to completion the final stages of physical evolution, the two do not long continue to progress *pari passu*, but physical (including cerebral) evolution presently reaches its culmination while social evolution continues indefinitely, that is, the systems of activity, socially prevalent and socially

evolved continue to enrich and extend and complicate their correlated processes.

CHAPTER IV

HUMAN SOCIETY AND THE SOCIETY OF ANIMALS

SECTION I.

While sociology deals with human society, it is well to note that the beginnings of social organization appear among animals lower in the scale of existence than man. This fact gives the student a ground plan for the superstructure of society. It indicates also how the informal beginning of society rests on a physical basis and develops in proportion to intelligence. It cannot be shown that there is an uninterrupted continuity of development from the social practices of animals to the social practices of human beings, but there is a similarity in many points between the lowest human societies and the highest animal societies. The chief difference is found in the variety and versatility of association. If we consider the law of conflict and survival, it applies alike to animal societies and to natural human groups; also the principle of association for protection is the same in both. The social instinct exhibited in the pure love of companionship is less pronounced in animal societies than in human societies. The sexual instinct plays an important part in each group, but has less force in the former. The greatest difference is found in a rapidly grow-

ing altruism and larger mental power of the human group which permit a high state of co-operation and organization.' In other words, animal societies show a few social qualities in embryo which never pass a low grade of development, while human societies show these and many others in a highly developed state.

We shall find roughly classified two great groups of animals, the non-social and the social, roughly corresponding to the carnivora and the herbivora. The former are highly individualistic, they hunt alone and live most of the year alone; the latter co-operate in defence, live in families, and develop in consequence elementary social qualities.

Some birds of different species work together unconsciously, each species seeking to help itself. Others of the same species develop a community life, they hold assemblages for migratory purposes, they mix out of pure sociability, and they have the family instinct. But, as Darwin clearly shows, in all animal association the moral sense seems to be wanting. There is no reflection on past acts and no comparison of past acts with present ones, no valuation of their relative importance—characteristics which give rise to morality.

Herds of antelopes live in harmony and peace, the leaders giving warning of danger to the group. Elephants have been seen in herds numbering from five to a hundred and fifty. These groups are based on family relationships. Monkeys of the Old World

live in troops composed of family groups. One species (*Cercopithecus*) engages in expeditions under the direction of a leader. He commands the troop, stations sentinels, and gives orders that are understood and obeyed. Another species (*Cynocephalus*), according to Brehm, exhibits a still higher state of organization.

SECTION 2.

Many influences have caused individuals to associate in groups. Among the more important may be mentioned the desire for companionship, including sexual attraction, the influences of climate, the physical conditions of the earth, the food supply, the consciousness of similarity, identity of interests, the necessity of protection against animals and men, the influence of controlling personalities, and co-operation in industry.

Responding to some or all of these influences, animals have formed social groups. Primitive men, moved by the same factors as the animals and often led by those with a more developed mentality and a keener social consciousness, formed themselves into groups in which social pleasure was fully awakened and in which various social and economic advantages appeared. Illustrations of how animals form into groups are given by the herds of buffaloes which once covered the western parts of America, by the beaver colonies to be found even yet in parts of that country, and by such social

insects as the ants and the bees. In some of these cases the group is a temporary one, in others more lasting, and in some so stable that one almost wonders if they do not in the matter of stability surpass human social groups.

The simplest aggregation of people without formal organization is called a horde. It is less than the human equivalent of the animal "herd." Its leadership is natural, not formal. Its bonds are stronger in some ways, but very little different from those natural bonds of physical and mental superiority and deference to be observed in animal groups. It represents one of the phases of social development. Numerous examples of a horde are cited by Westermarck in his *History of Human Marriage*. There is little organization among such peoples. The constituent families of hordes wander from place to place with no permanent dwellings; the group is large today and small tomorrow. There are some signs of temporary leadership, but no permanent organization. Life is largely subject to accident. Yet this group of people represents, to a certain extent, the foundation of human society, for it is out of this simple homogeneous assemblage that complex society has risen.

Within the human horde appear small, more closely related groups of people which form the primordial social organizations. Small industrial, family, and religious groups appear which gradually transform the rather indefinite mass into a social

order. These small centers of organized power appear spontaneously. They are the radiating centers of organized social relationships. Here Vogue begins to establish its power. Here Tradition begins to lay down its sacred laws. In these centers social interests find their organized expression. The superior man finds here a way to forward his own ambitions through leadership. The weaker cleave to the stronger because thus they find protection and benefit. Finally, relationships are adjusted and the small groups become independent. Beginning in the differences of sex, at an early period of social life the division of labor causes the differentiation into inchoate industrial groups. As social classes are founded largely on industrial occupations, industrial specialization gives an impetus to the general organization of society. Yet one must not forget that some social classes grow up apart from occupational interests. For example, the ruling class springs in part from the lust for power and deference to the superior, the ecclesiastical from fear of the unknown, the secret societies so often found in primitive groups from the desire for acknowledged precedence, and those strange groups based on the sex taboo observed in some primitive communities, from the mystery of reproduction and its allied phenomena. But in all of the changes that take place society is organized about small voluntary groups, springing up because of appreciation of the pleasure or advantage to be secured thereby. New

groups are formed by a process analogous to budding, but they often branch off in consequence of the development of such motives as jealousy of the power of a leader, fear of a superior, consciousness of temperamental difference between persons and the clashing and occluding of interests.

SECTION 3.

In primitive society the family life was very different from what it is at present. It was more indefinite and irregular. But, beginning with the sympathy of the mother for her offspring, the unity of the family group grew as the bonds of common interest multiplied. Members of the family group were held together primarily by kinship or blood relationship. Whether through the close association of the family group or through the actual consciousness of blood relationship, the family group finally became a unit of social order. Kinship played an important part in all the early phases of social organization. Those of the same blood recognized and protected one another, uniting in offensive and defensive war with other tribes. Such temporary union grew into racial or tribal unity and led to the development of race aversion.

But the family group enlarged in other ways than that of natural increase. In the warfare which occurred among various tribes it frequently happened that one tribe was conquered, broken, and scattered, and its members who survived the shock of battle

had no protection except when they joined themselves to other tribes. There was no state, no politics, no political government, but only the family or tribal organization. Hence, when an individual or a small family group was left alone, it was obliged to fight its own battles independently or else unite with some family for protection. It became a common custom for conquering tribes to adopt such stray survivors into their own tribes, the only conditions imposed being that of a strict compliance with the laws and customs of the tribe. Thus it was that the family group enlarged continually by natural increase and adoption. The adopted members became identified with the family, helping to fight its battles, following it through its migrations and engaging in the economic pursuits of the tribe.

There were always in early society certain tendencies to consolidate small groups into larger ones. Many causes contributed to this result. Among them may be mentioned the external pressure of the physical environment causing the various groups to unite for protection from the weather or from wild animals, the danger from stronger hostile groups which often forced weak groups to unite to resist a common enemy, the recognition of kind whereby like groups tended to unite and like individuals to associate with one another, and possibly, more than all, the industrial life demanding unity of effort. The attempt to satisfy a common hunger led to a common sympathy and a common co-operation. This

unity of effort extended to other departments of life and had a tendency to consolidate groups which otherwise would have been separated and destroyed.

CHAPTER V

DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN SOCIETY

SECTION I.

Probably language grew out of the instinctive cries and sounds produced by primitive man under the stress of strong emotions excited by elemental joy, fear, love, and hate, or out of the sounds which he heard about him in a nature full of danger or beauty. These sounds became conventionalized and united with his facial expressions and gestures—his prelingual methods of conveying his thoughts and feelings to others. Doubtless, progress began to be rapid in the development of language when the satisfaction of his social instincts led him to play with his fellows. Out of this social fellowship grew the rhythmic dance and choral song. The excitement of the primitive dance, linked as it so often was with the deepest feelings he possessed, the sex and hunger impulses, the joyous exhilaration of the mock combat, the aweinspiring ceremonies of tribal religion, quickened and heated the mind to the pitch of forging a language, which served to satisfy in a new way his desire for expression and at the same time tended to become a new sharp instrument of emotional stimulation. Once language had developed under social stimulation to the point where signs and sounds had become in-

dependent and distinguished in thought from the objects they designated, humanity had speech. After this achievement man was able to make comparatively rapid progress. While association provided the stimulus which gave rise to speech, the latter in turn became a veritable fulcrum of Archimedes in lifting social life to a new complexity and perfection.

Another important step was taken when language became written. Beginning with "reminders" like sticks stuck in the ground or holes dug therein or cords tied in knots, or strung with shells to assist the minstrel or medicine man of the group to recall certain important events, and proceeding through ideograms, signs standing for ideas, such as are still used by the Indians of the Southwest of America, written language developed phonograms, or signs which stood for certain phonetic values, as in the Chinese and especially in the Japanese language of modern times and in the ancient Egyptian language. The Phœnicians borrowed from the Egyptians certain of these phonograms, attached to them simple sounds and combined them variously in the different words in use and thus gave the world an alphabet. These probably in a general way are the steps in the development: "reminder," ideogram, phonogram, and letter. Written language had even greater importance for humanity in its social development than spoken language.

Language has always fulfilled an important func-

tion in social organization. Through it as a means of communication the small group has been developed and strengthened and other groups have been united. People of similar languages are attracted towards one another, while those of foreign languages have a tendency to repel one another. The difficulty of establishing social order among diverse groups of people, speaking different languages and having diversity of thought and sentiment, is very great. Even now this difficulty of socialization is observed in large American cities with their heterogeneous populations. But though in such cases language causes separation, it originally caused association. It is the attempt to communicate thought that gives birth to language. One who seeks for the origin of society will find one of its causes and one of its effects in the action and reaction of language.

SECTION 2.

Another of the important causes of the rise of social groups is the pressure of physical nature on the population. Apart from the fact that the food supply caused people to assemble in the localities where food was most plentiful and most easily obtained, the influences of climate and the physical surface of the earth forced people into groups. Wandering along the rivers in pursuit of fish and game, men came into contact with one another and learned to dwell together. The mountain ranges stayed their migrations and caused a denser popula-

tion on their slopes or in adjacent valleys. The shores of the ocean and inland seas and lakes caused them to pause for long periods and finally to establish permanent homes. Violent storms caused them to seek shelter in caves where early associations were formed, and the ice flow from the north caused the population to assemble in the southern valleys. Thus the influence of physical nature everywhere tends to favour the aggregation of men and their association.

The movement of tribes and races over the earth has caused the extinction of some, the breaking up of others, but the consolidation of still others. The pressure of nomad tribes on the ancient civilization of the various Aryan groups in Europe, of the Huns upon the Teutons, of the various Greek and Roman tribes upon one another, caused a closer social union among the survivors of the struggle. This pressure forces the growth of social institutions as a hothouse forces the growth of plants. These institutions are the result of new ideas, the result of the group consciousness struggling with new situations forced upon it by the pressure of a hostile group. Two of many historic illustrations may be cited to show this. When the white man reached America and began to settle in the North Atlantic region, two great groups of Indians were struggling for the possession of the Atlantic seaboard and the fertile valleys which led down to it. The Algonquins were pressing down from Canada upon the Iroquois already in possession of these places. One result was a confederation

known as the league of the Iroquois. As organization was devised whereby the various independent tribes were welded together for defensive purposes. A great development was taking place within these tribes when the coming of the whites interrupted the process. Another example may be seen in the Norman conquest of England. The more or less loosely organized elements of the British population, consisting of the ancient population elements, Celts, Angles, Saxons, and Danes, fused somewhat already in the early Saxon kingdoms and then developing under Danish rule into a larger and more solid organization, were finally welded into a demotic unity and a strongly organized whole under the Normans and their successors. The process culminated under the Tudors and early Stuarts. During the course of this development social structures were greatly multiplied in number. The aggregation of unlike population elements resulting in class conflicts forced the development of agencies of domination, status, and toleration. The instruments of justice, like the courts, were improved, all kinds of judicial machinery were invented like the jury, grand and petit. The laws were greatly multiplied and changed to meet new conditions. Even the common law, the child of custom, was greatly elaborated. Every form of social life underwent readjustment. Social devices of all sorts multiplied.

SECTION 3.

The union of various groups of people always depends to a considerable extent upon the existence of a common ethical sentiment, for ethics are deeply rooted in the emotions. In the beginning of society, as now, feeling played a much more important rôle than reason. The sociological basis of morality is custom. Custom is rooted in the feelings and in that mighty social force, social approbation. Therefore, tribal customs touching the relationship of man with man would tend to repel groups with different moral codes and attract those with similar.

The importance of moral sentiments in the formation of social groups rests on the fact that the moral codes of primitive peoples are very rigid and exacting, and therefore play a great part in the socializing process which makes for group unity. Hence, the origin of morality is of importance in any study of the origins of society.

Morality had one of its roots in mother love. At first it was purely instinctive, probably caused by blind natural selection. As such it brought in the wake of its manifestation its own emotional reward and thus became established in the feelings and habits of the creature.

The social root of actions which may come to have a moral value is to be found in custom, by which is meant an act adopted and practiced by a group of people. Out of some customs grow moral acts. Which actions shall become customary, and

which of the customary actions of a group shall become moral in their nature depends upon social considerations arising from the social life of the group rather than upon legal or economic considerations.

How an act may come to be customary and then moral may be illustrated best by a concrete example. A group of primitive people come face to face with a new experience such as a pestilence or a famine. At once individuals in that group begin to struggle with the problem of how to avert the calamity. In the individuals' minds psychologically there arises the stress and tension induced by fear in the presence of a new danger. The tendency of the human mind under such conditions is to relieve itself by motor reactions of some kind. Instead of anticipating the modern adage, "When you don't know what to do, do nothing," the primitive mind tends to do something—or anything. What shall be the act which is to relieve the emotional tension depends much upon the character of the minds composing that group, and upon their previous experiences—what they did in previous more or less similar cases. Or, in the absence of any similar experiences some one will do the first thing that suggests itself to him as in any way appropriate. Others may follow his example. Perhaps the families of these men do not die. After the danger is past what they did is recalled, it is related to others and becomes a part of the group's traditions. In any recurrence of the

same or a like danger this act will be performed by many imitators. Thus it will become established in the customs of that group. It is a psychological fact that custom, mere groupal habit, will soon attract to itself certain very definite and strong emotions, and these emotions will be strengthened when the act becomes traditional, fostered by forceful and dogmatic personalities and associated in the common consciousness with group safety.

Again, since some religious practices have their roots in similar emotional tensions, the custom often will be adopted by religion and be still further strengthened by coming under religiously dominating influences such as the fear of punishment or the hope of reward by supernatural beings. In all such ways may custom be established.

Whether a customary action was considered moral, immoral, or unmoral was determined by such considerations as the relations of the act to the welfare of the group, and the relations of certain instincts of the individuals to the traditions of the group. The falling away of certain individuals from fixed customary standards aroused ethical questions. This is in accordance with the law of mental development, that matters come to our knowledge by our first becoming aware of the incongruity between the feelings we have enjoyed in the presence of the usual and the feelings aroused when the smooth current of our consciousness has been disturbed by the unusual. Therefore, originally morality was chief-

ly negative: "Thou shalt not" do this or that. Primitive life is largely a life of privation, a constant struggle against the forces of nature, against wild animals and hostile men. Suffering was the common lot. It was an economy of pain. Hence, primitive ethics and primitive religion stressed negative acts of self-deprivation and suffering. This tendency, moreover, was in entire accord with the necessity of repressing the individual in the interests of the group. Only after the group had become consolidated and unified to a certain degree was it safe to emphasize and encourage individual acts positive, independent, and original in their nature. Such acts again were connected psychologically with the partiality of the mother for her child, leading her to sacrifice herself for its benefit, and strengthened by the fact that after a certain social development had been reached they were of advantage for the survival of the group, so that they finally became sanctioned by the whole group. Thus moral sentiment expressed itself in positive acts, and morality became conscious and rational.

Beginning thus with self-sacrifice for the young, the altruistic act extended to self-sacrifice for the wider kindred within the group, then further with the growing consciousness of kind so as to include the nation, the Kingdom of God, and the whole world.

SECTION 4.

Leadership is implied in all movements of mankind where there is human concerted action. It may be only temporary or accidental leadership, but it must exist under all circumstances except where men are moved to act by common impulse. Wherever, then, there is social order there will be, to a certain degree, leadership. Whether the leader is the head of the household, the medicine man, the man rich in cattle and land, as in ancient Ireland, the chief of the tribe, or the temporary war chief, who leads the host in battle, social order is established in proportion as leadership becomes strong and permanent. As social development proceeds, leadership becomes more varied in its fields. At first the leader was only the strong man, or the man of superior cunning, as the medicine man. Out from these crude beginnings of social leadership, however, in response to growing complexity of social interests and specialization of functions sprang leadership in many lines of activity. Eventually this leadership may develop into a kingship, a parliament, a council, or a constitution; or into fashions and crazes; into educational, economic, and social orthodoxies; into vogues, philosophies, modes of thought, and varieties of the *Zeitgeist*; but it must appear somewhere as a representative of social authority. It becomes a great power for consolidating and unifying the group, tribe, or nation and then for enriching

the social life of the particular group.

While the establishment of justice is not the primary cause of social amalgamation, yet once the group has been established, it certainly hastens the process of socialization. In fact, wherever we find social order appearing there is an opportunity for the development of civil justice, for people cannot associate on a common basis without some means of enforcing justice. The social elements act and react against one another blindly before formal justice is established. Conflicts arise between individuals in the group which must be settled. At first might makes right—the stronger man overpowers his antagonist and makes a decision from his own standpoint. But soon civil justice brings in a third party who adjusts the relations between the two, allotting to each man his just dues. The first stirrings of a sense of social justice may even be observed in a herd of animals when one bullying member finally attracts the attention of a number of the herd who unite in meting out punishment to the offender and so secure a form of justice between the two individuals primarily involved. In the human group the origins are much more complex. Here the brute strength, impartial judgment, and finer sympathy of a third individual are supplemented by the weight of tradition as to moral rights and duties and the usages more or less applicable to the dispute, and by an appreciation of the necessity of smoothing out differences that imperil the welfare of the group.

Moreover, the increased appreciation of leadership and the growth of moral sentiments in even the lowest savages make for increased deference to the decision of the third party. Like moral sentiment justice began within the group. Within the confines of a blood-kindred would the moral sense first express itself most naturally and easily. Special impetus to the tendencies just noticed to secure formal means of settling disputes doubtless was given by the danger from a hostile group.

SECTION 5.

Perhaps no other visible agency has accomplished so many and such great changes in the progress of society as war. Conflict of individuals has led to strength of individual character, just as conflict between tribes has led to social strength. True they may both end in the destruction of one or both parties, but those who survive are made stronger to cope with the opposing elements of social life. War has destroyed individuals, tribes, nations. Millions of lives and countless treasures have been sacrificed to war, and yet through it have developed many of the finer qualities of life. Through it man has been taught to obey the will of the stronger; through it he has been taught not to abuse the weak. War is great in discipline, preparing wild or savage people for the conduct of civil government. It is one of the most important factors in accounting for the origin of many social institutions. War, however, gave

rise to a firmer social structure chiefly by a rough-hewing selective process which threw out all unsound material, and, as Ward has shown, by so multiplying social contracts between alien peoples as to stimulate the growth of rigid social structures. It was especially important in securing the transition from an ethnic to a civil society. On the other hand, in mutual aid, we have a social beginning of great importance. Arising in the animal group by natural selection mutual aid developed in the kinship group by reason of the heightened social pleasure it provided, and was firmly established in the war measures invented against enemies of the group.

CHAPTER VI

SITUATION AND NUMBERS OF THE HUMAN RACE

The organization of races outside of the European and Asiatic sphere of civilization does not permit any density of population to exist. Small communities cultivating their narrow patches of ground are separated from each other by wide empty spaces which either serve for hunting-grounds or lie useless and vacant. These limit the possibilities of intercourse, and render large permanent assemblies of men impossible. Hunting races, among whom agriculture does not exist or tends to vanish, often dwell so thinly scattered that there will be only one man, frequently less, to 24 square miles. Where there is some agriculture, as among many Indian tribes, among Dyaks, in Papua, we find from 10 to 40 in the same area ; as it develops further, in central Africa for instance, or the Malay Archipelago, from 100 to 300. In the northwest of America the fishing-races who live on the coast run to 100 in 20 square miles, and the cattle-keeping nomads to about the same. Where fishing and agriculture are combined, as in Oceania, we find as many as 500. The same figure is reached in the steppes of Western Asia by the partly settled, partly nomad population. Here we cross the threshold of another form of civilization. Where trade and industry combine to operate there is susten-

ance for 10,000 persons (as in India and East Asia), or 15,000 (as in Europe) to 24 square miles.

In density of population lies not only steadiness of and security for vigorous growth, but also the immediate means of promoting civilization. The closer men are in contact, the more they can impart to each other, the less does what is acquired by civilization go to waste, the higher does competition raise the activity of all their powers. The increase and maintenance of the numbers are intimately connected with the development of culture; a population thinly scattered over a large district means low civilization, while in old or new centers of civilization we find the people in dense masses. China and India reckon their inhabitants at 600,000,000, but an equivalent area of the intervening region of the Central Asiatic nomads, Mongolia, Tibet, East Turkestan, cannot show a sixtieth of the number. Six-sevenths of the earth's inhabitants belong to civilized countries.

While the history of the European nations for centuries past shows the same decided tendency to increase which we observe even in ancient times, the uncivilized races offer examples of shrinkage and retrogression such as we find in the case of the others, if at all, only lasting over a short period, and then as the result of casualties such as war and pestilence. The very thinness of the population is a cause of their decay; their smaller numbers are more readily brought to the point of dwindling or vanishing. Rapid using-up of the vital powers is a characteristic of all the races in

the lower stages of civilization. Their economical basis is narrow and incomplete, frugality only too often verges on poverty, scarcity is a frequent visitor, and all those measures of precaution with which sanitary science surrounds our life are lacking. In the struggle with the too powerful forces of nature, as in the Arctic regions or the steppe-districts of the southern hemisphere, on the confines of the inhabited world, they often succumb till they are completely wiped out, and a whole race perishes. It is quite a mistake to refer, as is often done, the extinction of barbarous races, of which we hear so much, solely to contact with superior civilization. But closer consideration enables us to recognise self-destruction as a no less frequent case. The two work as a rule together ; neither would attain its end so quickly without the co-operation of the other. The basis of a healthy increase in population is an approximate balance of the sexes ; this among uncivilized people is generally disturbed, and the number of children small. War, murder, and kidnapping all contribute to reduce the population. Human life is of small value, as human sacrifices and cannibalism sufficiently indicate. Lastly, man in a state of nature is far from possessing that ideal health of which so many have fabled ; the negroes of Africa can alone be described as a robust race. Australians, Polynesians, Americans, on the other hand, are far more subject to diseases than civilized men are, and adapt themselves to new climates with difficulty. There is no question but that these peoples were in many districts slowly dying

out by sickness before the appearance of Europeans. But no doubt the arrival of civilization disturbs society down to its roots. It contracts the available space, thus altering one of the conditions upon which the peculiar social and political arrangements of races in a natural state were framed. It introduces wants and enjoyments which are not in harmony with the mode of living usual among these people, or their capacity for labor. It brings upon them diseases previously unknown, which on a new soil commit frightful ravages ; and inevitable quarrels and fighting besides. Over the larger territories, such as North America, Australia, New Zealand, the progress of civilization led to the crowding of the aboriginal races into the least favourable districts, and therewith to the diminution of their numbers.

CHAPTER VII

THE EFFECT OF GEOGRAPHIC FACTORS IN HISTORY

SECTION I.

Man can no more be scientifically studied apart from the ground which he tills, or the lands over which he travels, or the seas over which he trades, than polar bear or desert cactus can be understood apart from its habitat. Man's relations to his environment are infinitely more numerous and complex than those of the most highly organized plant or animal. So complex are they that they constitute a legitimate and necessary object of special study. The investigation which they receive in anthropology, ethnology, sociology, and history is piecemeal and partial, limited as to the race, cultural development, epoch, country or variety of geographic conditions taken into account. Hence all these sciences, together with history, so far as history undertakes to explain the causes of events, fail to reach a satisfactory solution of their problems largely because the geographic factor which enters into them all has not been thoroughly analyzed. Man has been so noisy about the way he has "conquered Nature," and Nature has been so silent in her persistent influence over man, that the geographic factor in the equation of human development has been overlooked.

In every problem of history there are two main

factors, variously stated as heredity and environment, man and his geographic conditions, the internal forces of race and the external forces of habitat. Now the geographic element in the long history of human development has been operating strongly and operating persistently. Herein lies its importance. It is a stable force. It never sleeps. This natural environment, this physical basis of history, is for all intents and purposes immutable in comparison with the other factor in the problem—shifting, plastic, progressive, retrogressive man.

SECTION 2.

As the surface of the earth presents obstacles, so it offers channels for the easy movement of humanity, grooves whose direction determines the destination of unknowing, unplanned migrations, and whose termini become, therefore, regions of historical importance. Along these nature-made highways history repeats itself. The maritime plain of Palestine has been an established route of commerce and war from the time of Sennacherib to Napoleon. The Danube valley has admitted to central Europe a long list of barbarian invaders, covering the period from Attila the Hun to the Turkish besiegers of Vienna in 1683. The history of the Danube valley has been one of warring throngs, of shifting political frontiers, and unassimilated races; but as the river is a great natural highway, every neighboring state wants to front upon it and strives to secure it as a boundary.

The movements of peoples constantly recur to these

old grooves. The unmarked path of the voyager's canoe, bringing out pelts from lake Superior to the fur market at Montreal, is followed today by whaleback steamers with their cargoes of Manitoba wheat. To-day the Mohawk depression through the northern Appalachians diverts some of Canada's trade from the Great Lakes to the Hudson, just as in the seventeenth century it enabled the Dutch at New Amsterdam and later the English at Albany to tap the fur trade of Canada's frozen forests. Formerly a line of stream and portage, it carries now the Erie Canal and New York Central Railroad. Similarly the narrow level belt of land extending from the mouth of the Hudson to the eastern elbow of the lower Delaware, defining the outer margin of the rough hill country of northern New Jersey and the inner margin of the smooth coastal plain, has been from savage days such a natural throughfare. Here ran the trail of the Lenni-Lenapi Indians; a little later the old Dutch road, between New Amsterdam and the Delaware trading-posts; yet later the King's Highway from New York to Philadelphia. In 1838 it became the route of the Delaware and Raritan Canal, and more recently of the Pennsylvania Railroad Between New York and Philadelphia. Thus natural conditions fix the channels in which the stream of humanity most easily moves, determine within certain limits the direction of its flow, the velocity and volume of its current. Every new flood tends to fit itself approximately into the old banks, seeks first these lines of least resistance, and only when it finds them blocked or pre-empted does it turn

to more difficult paths.

The great belt of deserts and steppes extending across the Old World gives us a vast territory of rare historical uniformity. From time immemorial they have borne and bred tribes of wandering herdsmen; they have sent out the invading hordes who, in successive waves of conquest, have overwhelmed the neighboring river lowlands of Eurasia and Africa. They have given birth in turn to Scythians, Indo-Aryans, Avars, Huns, Saracens, Tartars and Turks, as to the Tuareg tribes of the Sahara, the Sudanese and Bantu folk of the African Grasslands. But whether these various peoples have been Negroes, Hamites, Semites, Indo-Europeans, or Mongolians, they have always been pastoral nomads. The description given by Herodotus of the ancient Scythians is applicable in its main features to the Kirghis and Kalmuk who inhabit the Caspian plains today. The environment of this dry grassland operates now to produce the same mode of life and social organizations as it did 2,400 years ago; stamps the cavalry tribes of Cossacks as it did the mounted Huns; energizes its sons by its dry bracing air, toughens them by its harsh conditions of life, organizes them into a mobilized army, always moving with its pastoral commissariat. Then when population presses too hard upon the meager sources of subsistence, when a summer drought burns the pastures and dries up the water-holes, it sends them forth on a mission of conquest, to seek abundance in the better watered lands of their agricultural neighbours. Again and again the

productive valleys of the Hoangho, Indus, Ganges, Tigris and Euphrates, Nile, Volga, Dnieper, and Danube have been brought into subjection by the imperious nomads of arid Asia, just as the "hoe-people" of the Niger and upper Nile have so often been conquered by the herdsmen of the African grasslands. Thus, regardless of race or epoch—Ilyksos or Kaffir—history tends to repeat itself in these rainless tracts, and involves the better watered districts along their borders when the vast tribal movements extend into these peripheral lands.

SECTION 3.

Owing to the evolution of geographic relations, the physical environment favorable to one stage of development may be adverse to another, and *vice versa*. For instance, a small, isolated, and protected habitat, like that of Egypt, Phœnicia, Crete, and Greece, encourages the birth and precocious growth of civilization; but later it may cramp progress, and lend the stamp of arrested development to a people who were once the model for all their little world. Open and wind-swept Russia, lacking these small warm nurseries where Nature could cuddle her children, has bred upon its boundless plains a massive, untutored, homogeneous folk, fed upon the crumbs of culture that have fallen from the richer tables of Europe. But that item of area is a variable quantity in the equation. It changes its character at a higher state of cultural development. Consequently, when the Muscovite people, instructed

by the example of western Europe, shall have grown up intellectually, economically, and politically to their big territory, its area will become a great national asset. Russia will come into its own, heir to a long-withheld inheritance. Many of its previous geographic disadvantages will vanish, like the diseases of childhood, while its massive size will dwarf many previous advantages of its European neighbours.

Let us consider the interplay of the forces of land and sea apparent in every country with a maritime location. In some cases a small, infertile, niggardly country conspires with a beckoning sea to drive its sons out upon the deep; in others a wide territory with a generous soil keeps its well-fed children at home and silences the call of the sea. In ancient Phœnicia and Greece, in Norway, Finland, New England, in savage Chile and Tierra del Fuego, and the Indian coast district of British Columbia, and southern Alaska, a long, broken shoreline, numerous harbors, outlying islands, abundant timber for the construction of ships, difficult communication by land, all tempted the inhabitants to a sea-faring life. While the sea drew, the land drove in the same direction. There a hilly or mountainous interior putting obstacles in the way of landward expansion, sterile slopes, a paucity of level, arable land, an excessive or deficient rainfall withholding from agriculture the rewards of tillage—some or all of these factors combined to compel the inhabitants to seek on the sea the livelihood denied by the land. Here both forces worked in the same direction.

In England conditions were much the same, and from the sixteenth century produced there a predominant maritime development which was due not solely to a long indented coast-line and an exceptional location for participating in European and American trade. Its limited island area, its large extent of rugged hills and chalky soil fit only for pasturage, and the lack of a really generous natural endowment made it slow to answer the demands of a growing population, till the industrial development of the nineteenth century exploited its mineral wealth. So the English turned to the sea—to fish, to trade, to colonize. Holland's conditions made for the same development. She united advantages of coast-line and position with a small infertile territory, consisting chiefly of water-soaked grazing lands. When at the zenith of her maritime development, a native authority estimated that the soil of Holland could not support more than one-eighth of her inhabitants. The meager products of the land had to be eked out by the harvest of the sea. Fish assumed an important place in the diet of the Dutch, and when a process of curing it was discovered, laid the foundation of Holland's export trade. A geographical location central to the Baltic and North Sea countries, and accessible to France and Portugal, combined with a position at the mouth of the great German rivers made it absorb the carrying trade of northern Europe. Land and sea co-operated in its maritime development,

SECTION 4.

Often the forces of land and sea are directly opposed. If a country's geographic conditions are favorable to agriculture and offer room for growth of population, the land forces prevail, because man is primarily a terrestrial animal. Such a country illustrates what Chisholm, with Attic nicety of speech, calls "the influence of bread-power on history," as opposed to Mahan's sea-power. France, like England, had a long coast-line, abundant harbors, and an excellent location for maritime supremacy and colonial expansion; but her larger area and greater amount of fertile soil put off the hour of a redundant population such as England suffered from, even in Henry VIII's time. Moreover, in consequence of steady continental expansion from the twelfth to the eighteenth century and a political unification which made its area more effective for the support of the people, the French of Richelieu's time, except those from certain districts, took to the sea, not by natural impulse as did the English and Dutch, but rather under the spur of government initiative. They therefore achieved far less in maritime trade and colonization. In ancient Palestine, a long stretch of coast, poorly equipped with harbors, but accessible to the rich Mediterranean trade, failed to offset the attractions of the gardens and orchards of the Jordan valley and the pastures of the Judean hills, or to overcome the land-born predilections and aptitudes of the desert-bred Jews. Similarly, the river-fringed peninsulas of Virginia and Maryland of America, opening wide

their doors to the incoming sea, were powerless, nevertheless, to draw the settlers away from the riotous productiveness of the wide tidewater plains. Here again the geographic force of the land outweighed that of the sea and became the dominant factor in directing the activities of the inhabitants.

SECTION 5.

Mountain regions discourage the budding of genius because they are areas of isolation, confinement, remote from the great currents of men and ideas that move along the river valleys. They are regions of much labor and little leisure, of poverty today and anxiety for the morrow, of toil-cramped hands and toil-dulled brains. In the fertile alluvial plains are wealth, leisure, contact with many minds, large urban centers where commodities and ideas are exchanged. The two contrasted environments produce directly certain economic and social results, which in turn become the causes of secondary intellectual and artistic effects. The low mountains of central Germany which von Treitschke cites as homes of poets and artists, owing to abundant and varied mineral wealth, are the seats of active industries and dense populations, while their low reliefs present no serious obstacle to the numerous highways across them. They, therefore, afford all conditions for culture.

CHAPTER VIII

MENTAL LIFE AND EDUCATION

SECTION I.

The thoughts and actions of civilized man and those found in more primitive forms of society prove that, in various groups of mankind, the mind responds quite differently when exposed to the same conditions. Lack of logical connection in its conclusions, lack of control of will, are apparently two of its fundamental characteristics in primitive society. In the formation of opinions, belief takes the place of logical demonstration. The emotional value of opinions is great, and consequently they quickly lead to action. The will appears unbalanced, there being a readiness to yield to strong emotions, and a stubborn resistance in trifling matters.

There are two possible explanations of different manifestations of the mind of man. It may be that the minds of different races show differences of organization; that is to say, the laws of mental activity may not be the same for all minds. But it may also be that the organization of mind is practically identical among all races of man; that mental activity follows the same laws everywhere, but that its manifestations depend upon the character of individual experience that is subjected to the action of these laws.

It is quite evident that the activities of the human

mind depend upon these two elements. The organization of the mind may be defined as the group of laws which determine the modes of thought and of action, irrespective of the subject-matter of mental activity. Subject to such laws are the manner of discrimination between perceptions, the manner in which perceptions associate themselves with previous perceptions, the manner in which a stimulus leads to action, and the emotions produced by stimuli. These laws determine to a great extent the manifestations of the mind.

But, on the other hand, the influence of individual experience can easily be shown to be very great. The bulk of the experience of man is gained from oft-repeated impressions. It is one of the fundamental laws of psychology that the repetition of mental processes increases the facility with which these processes are performed, and decreases the degree of consciousness that accompanies them. This law expresses the well-known phenomena of habit. When a certain perception is frequently associated with another previous perception, the one will habitually call forth the other. When a certain stimulus frequently results in a certain action, it will tend to call forth habitually the same action. If a stimulus has often produced certain emotion, it will tend to reproduce it every time.

The explanation of the activity of the mind of man, therefore, requires the discussion of two distinct problems. The first bears upon the question of unity or diversity of organization of the mind, while the second bears upon the diversity produced by the variety of

contents of the mind as found in the various social and geographical environments. The task of the investigator consists largely in separating these two causes and in attributing to each its proper share in the development of the peculiarities of the mind. It is the latter problem, principally, which is of interest to the folk-lorist. When we define as folk-lore the total mass of traditional matter present in the mind of a given people at any given time, we recognize that this matter must influence the opinions and activities of the people more or less according to its quantitative and qualitative value, and also that the actions of each individual must be influenced to a greater or less extent by the mass of traditional material present in his mind.

SECTION 2.

We will first devote our attention to the question, "Do differences exist in the organization of the human mind?" In answering this question, we must clearly distinguish between the influences of civilization and of race. A number of anatomical facts point to the conclusion that the races of Africa, Australia, and Melanesia are to a certain extent inferior to the races of Asia, America, and Europe. We find that on the average the size of the brain of the negroid races is less than the size of the brain of the other races; and the difference in favor of the mongoloid and white races is so great that we are justified in assuming a certain correlation between their mental ability and the increased size of their brain. At the same time it must

be borne in mind that the variability of the mongoloid and white races on the one hand, and of the negroid races on the other, is so great that only a small number, comparatively speaking, of individuals belonging to the latter have brains smaller than any brains found among the former ; and that, on the other hand, only a few individuals of the mongoloid races have brains so large that they would not occur at all among the black races. That is to say, the bulk of the two groups of races have brains of the same capacities but individuals with heavy brains are proportionately more frequent among the mongoloid and white races than among the negroid races. Probably this difference in the size of the brain is accompanied by differences in structure, although no satisfactory information on this point is available. On the other hand, if we compare civilized people of any race with uncivilized people of the same race, we do not find any anatomical differences which would justify us in assuming any fundamental differences in mental constitution.

When we consider the same question from a purely psychological point of view, we recognize that one of the most fundamental traits which distinguish the human mind from the animal mind is common to all races of man. It is doubtful if any animal is able to form an abstract conception such as that of number, or any conception of the abstract relations of phenomena. We find that this is done by all races of man. A developed language with grammatical categories presupposes the ability of expressing abstract relations, and, since

every known language has grammatical structure, we must assume that the faculty of forming abstract ideas is a common property of man. It has often been pointed out that the concept of number is developed very differently among different peoples. While in most languages we find numerical systems based upon the 10, we find that certain tribes in Brazil, and others in Australia, have numeral systems based on the 3, or even on the 2, which involve the impossibility of expressing high numbers. Although these numerical systems are very slightly developed as compared with our own, we must not forget that the abstract idea of number must be present among these people, because, without it, no method of counting is possible. It may be worth while to mention one or two other facts taken from the grammars of primitive people, which will make it clear that all grammar presupposes abstraction. The three personal pronouns—I, thou, and he—occur in all human languages. The underlying idea of these pronouns is the clear distinction between the self as speaker, the person or object spoken to, and that spoken of. We also find that nouns are classified in a great many ways in different languages. While all the older Indo-European languages classify nouns according to sex, other languages classify nouns as animate or inanimate, or as human and not human, etc. Activities are also classified in many different ways. It is at once clear that every classification of this kind involves the formation of an abstract idea. The processes of abstraction are the same in all languages, and they do

not need any further discussion, except in so far as we may be inclined to value differently the systems of classification and the results of abstraction.

SECTION 3.

The question whether the power to inhibit impulses is the same in all races of man is not so easily answered. It is an impression obtained by many travellers, and also based upon experiences gained in our own country, that primitive man and the less educated have in common a lack of control of emotions, and they give way more readily to an impulse than civilized man and the highly educated. I believe that this conception is based largely upon the neglect to consider the occasions on which a strong control of impulses is demanded in various forms of society. What I mean will become clear when I call your attention to the often described power of endurance exhibited by Indian captives who undergo torture at the hands of their enemies. When we want to gain a true estimate of the power of primitive man to control impulses, we must not compare the control required on certain occasions among ourselves with the control exerted by primitive man on the same occasions. If, for instance, our social etiquette forbids the expression of feelings of personal discomfort and of anxiety, we must remember that personal etiquette among primitive men may not require any inhibition of the same kind. We must rather look for those occasions on which inhibition is required by the customs of primitive man. Such are,

for instance, the numerous cases of taboo, that is, of prohibitions of the use of certain foods, or of the performance of certain kinds of work, which sometimes require a considerable amount of self-control. When an Eskimo community is on the point of starvation, and their religious proscriptions forbid them to make use of the seals that are basking on the ice, the amount of self-control of the whole community, which restrains them from killing these seals, is certainly very great. Cases of this kind are very numerous, and prove that primitive man has the ability to control his impulses, but that this control is exerted on occasions which depend upon the character of the social life of the people, and which do not coincide with the occasions on which we expect and require control of impulses.

The third point in which the mind of primitive man seems to differ from that of civilized man is in its power of choosing between perceptions and actions according to their value. On this power rests the whole domain of art and of ethics. An object or an action becomes of artistic value only when it is chosen from among other perceptions or other actions on account of its beauty. An action becomes moral only when it is chosen from among other possible actions on account of its ethical value. No matter how crude the standards of primitive man may be in regard to these two points, we recognize that all of them possess an art, and that all of them possess ethical standards. It may be that their art is quite contrary to our artistic feeling. It may be that their ethical standards outrage our moral

code. We must clearly distinguish between the æsthetic and ethical codes and the existence of an æsthetic and ethical standard.

SECTION 4.

We next turn to a consideration of the second question propounded here, namely, to an investigation of the influence of the contents of the mind upon the formation of thoughts and actions. We will take these up in the same order in which we considered the previous question. We will first direct our attention to the phenomena of perception. It has been observed by many travellers that the senses of primitive man are remarkably well trained, and that he is an excellent observer. The adeptness of the experienced hunter, who finds the tracks of his game where the eye of a European would not see the faintest indication, is an instance of this kind. While the power of perception of primitive man is excellent, it would seem that his power of logical interpretation of perception is deficient. I think it can be shown that the reason for this fact is not founded on any fundamental peculiarity of the mind of primitive man, but lies, rather, in the character of the ideas with which the new perception associates itself. In our own community a mass of observations and of thoughts is transmitted to the child. These thoughts are the result of careful observation and speculation of our present and of past generations; but they are transmitted to most individuals as traditional matter, much the same as folk-lore. The child asso-

ciates new perceptions with this whole mass of traditional material, and interprets his observations by its means. I believe it is a mistake to assume that the interpretation made by each civilized individual is a complete logical process. We associate a phenomenon with a number of known facts, the interpretations of which are assumed as known, and we are satisfied with the reduction of a new fact to these previously known facts. For instance, if the average individual hears of the explosion of a previously unknown chemical, he is satisfied to reason that certain materials are known to have the property of exploding under proper conditions, and that consequently the unknown substance has the same quality. On the whole, I do not think that we should try to argue still further, and really try to give a full explanation of the causes of the explosion.

The difference in the mode of thought of primitive man and of civilized man seems to consist largely in the difference of character of the traditional material with which the new perception associates itself. The instruction given to the child of primitive man is not based on centuries of experimentation, but consists of the crude experience of generations. When a new experience enters the mind of primitive man, the same process which we observe among civilized men brings about an entirely different series of associations, and therefore results in a different type of explanation. A sudden explosion will associate itself in his mind, perhaps, with a tale which he has heard in regard

to the mythical history of the world, and consequently will be accompanied by superstitious fear. When we recognize that, neither among civilized men nor among primitive men, the average individual carries to completion the attempt at causal explanation of phenomena, but carries it only so far as to amalgamate it with other previously known facts, we recognize that the result of the whole process depends entirely upon the character of the traditional material: herein lies the immense importance of folk-lore in determining the mode of thought. Herein lies particularly the enormous influence of current philosophic opinion upon the masses of the people, and herein lies the influence of the dominant scientific theory upon the character of scientific work.

It would be in vain to try to understand the development of modern science without an intelligent understanding of modern philosophy; it would be in vain to try to understand the history of mediæval science without an intelligent knowledge of mediæval theology; and so it is in vain to try to understand primitive science without an intelligent knowledge of primitive mythology. Mythology, theology, and philosophy are different terms for the same influences which shape the current of human thought, and which determine the character of the attempts of man to explain the phenomena of nature. To primitive man—who has been taught to consider the heavenly orbs as animate beings, who sees in every animal a being more powerful than man, to whom the mountains, trees, and stones

are endowed with life—explanations of phenomena will suggest themselves entirely different from those to which we are accustomed, since we base our conclusions upon the existence of matter and force as bringing about the observed results. If we do not consider it possible to explain the whole range of phenomena as the result of matter and force alone, all our explanations of natural phenomena must take a different aspect.

It is evident that, the fewer the number of traditional elements that enter into our reasoning, and the clearer we endeavor to be in regard to the hypothetical part of our reasoning, the more logical will be our conclusions. There is an undoubted tendency in the advance of civilization to eliminate traditional elements, and to gain a clearer and clearer insight into the hypothetical basis of our reasoning. It is therefore not surprising that, with the advance of civilization, reasoning becomes more and more logical, not because each individual carries out his thought in a more logical manner, but because the traditional material which is handed down to each individual has been thought out and worked out more thoroughly and more carefully. While in primitive civilization the traditional material is doubted and examined by only a very few individuals, the number of thinkers who try to free themselves from the fetters of tradition increases as civilization advances.

SECTION 5.

The influence of traditional material upon the life of

man is not restricted to his thoughts, but manifests itself no less in his activities. The comparison between civilized man and primitive man in this respect is even more instructive than in the preceding case. A comparison between the modes of life of different nations, and particularly of civilized man and of primitive man, makes it clear that an enormous number of our actions are determined entirely by traditional associations. When we consider, for instance, the whole range of our daily life, we notice how strictly we are dependent upon tradition that cannot be accounted for by any logical reasoning. We eat our three meals every day, and feel unhappy if we have to forego one of them. There is no physiological reason which demands three meals a day, and we find that many people are satisfied with two meals, while others enjoy four or even more. The range of animals and plants which we utilize for food is limited, and we have a decided aversion against eating dogs, or horses, or cats. There is certainly no objective reason for such aversion, since a great many people consider dogs and horses as dainties. When we consider fashions, the same becomes still more apparent. To appear in the fashions of our forefathers of two centuries ago would be entirely out of the question, and would expose one to ridicule. The same is true of table manners. To smack one's lips is considered decidedly bad style, and may even incite feelings of disgust; while among the Indians, for instance, it would be considered as in exceedingly bad taste not to smack one's lips when one is invited to

dinner, because it would suggest that the guest does not enjoy his dinner. The whole range of actions that are considered as proper and improper cannot be explained by any logical reasons, but are almost all entirely due to custom ; that is to say, they are purely traditional. This is even true of customs which excite strong emotions, as, for instance, those produced by infractions of modesty.

SECTION 6.

This leads us to the third problem, which is closely associated with the difference between the manifestation of the power of civilized man and of primitive man to inhibit impulses. It is the question of choice as dependent upon value. It is evident from the preceding remarks that, on the whole, we value most highly what conforms to our previous actions. This does not imply that it must be identical with our previous actions, but it must be on the line of development of our previous actions. This is particularly true of ethical concepts. No action can find the approval of a people which is fundamentally opposed to its customs and traditions. Among ourselves it is considered proper and a matter of course to treat the old with respect, for children to look after the welfare of their aged parents ; and not to do so would be considered base ingratitude. Among the Eskimo we find an entirely different standard. It is required of children to kill their parents when they have become so old as to be helpless and no longer of any use to the family or to the community. It would

be considered a breach of filial duty not to kill the aged parent. Revolting though this custom may seem to us, it is founded on the ethical law of the Eskimo, which rests on the whole mass of traditional lore and custom.

One of the best examples of this kind is found in the relation between individuals belonging to different tribes. There are a number of primitive hordes to whom every stranger not a member of the horde is an enemy, and where it is right to damage the enemy to the best of one's power and ability, and if possible to kill him. This custom is founded largely on the idea of the solidarity of the horde, and of the feeling that it is the duty of every member of the horde to destroy all possible enemies. Therefore every person not a member of the horde must be considered as belonging to a class entirely distinct from the members of the horde, and is treated accordingly. We can trace the gradual broadening of the feeling of fellowship during the advance of civilization. The feeling of fellowship in the horde expands to the feeling of unity of the tribe, to a recognition of bonds established by a neighborhood of habitat, and further on to the feeling of fellowship among members of nations. This seems to be the limit of the ethical concept of fellowship of man which we have reached at the present time. When we analyze the strong feeling of nationality which is so potent at the present time, we recognize that it consists largely in the idea of the preeminence of that community whose member we happen to be,—

in the preeminent value of its language, of its customs, and of its traditions, and in the belief that it is right to preserve its peculiarities and to impose them upon the rest of the world. The feeling of nationality as here expressed, and the feeling of solidarity of the horde, are of the same order, although modified by the gradual expansion of the idea of fellowship; but the ethical point of view which makes it justifiable at the present time to increase the well-being of one nation at the cost of another, the tendency to value one's own civilization as higher than that of the whole race of mankind, are the same as those which prompt the actions of primitive man, who considers every stranger as an enemy, and who is not satisfied until the enemy is killed. It is somewhat difficult for us to recognize that the value which we attribute to our own civilization is due to the fact that we participate in this civilization, and that it has been controlling all our actions since the time of our birth; but it is certainly conceivable that there may be other civilizations based perhaps on different traditions and on a different equilibrium of emotion and reason, which are of no less value than ours, although it may be impossible for us to appreciate their values without having grown up under their influence.

SECTION 7.

Our considerations make it probable that the wide differences between the manifestations of the human mind in various stages of culture may be due almost

entirely to the form of individual experience, which is determined by the geographical and social environment of the individual. It would seem that, in different races, the organization of the mind is on the whole alike, and that the varieties of mind found in different races do not exceed, perhaps not even reach, the amount of normal individual variation in each race. It has been indicated that, notwithstanding this similarity in the form of individual mental processes, the expression of mental activity of a community tends to show a characteristic historical development. From a comparative study of these changes among the races of man is derived our theory of the general development of human culture. But the development of *culture* must not be confounded with the development of *mind*. Culture is an expression of the achievements of the mind, and shows the cumulative effects of the activities of many minds. But it is not an expression of the organization of the minds constituting the community, which may in no way differ from the minds of a community occupying a much more advanced stage of culture.

CHAPTER IX

FAMILY LIFE

SECTION I.

Family life existed before marriage ceremonies. Family life man has in common with the brutes. Marriage is a social institution strictly limited to human kind. It has been doubted whether certain tribes possess any positive marriage ceremonies; yet it is certain that among many of the lower tribes existing now, society tacitly approves very simple ceremonies, and every society thus far studied, however low in culture, regulates the family relationships. Marriage begins when a more or less formal assent must be secured by the groups most intimately concerned, as, for example, the families of the two persons concerned.

How marriage sprang up out of a situation in which man and woman cohabited as they pleased can only be conjectured. Did the habit of society interfering with one of the most powerful instincts grow up by reason of the fact that sons and daughters were looked upon as possessions which could not be taken away without consent? Or did it originate with the strong man imposing his dominating habit as a general law for all men of his tribe in their dealings with women? Or, was it the fruit of male jealousy? Or, again, did it arise, as Ward

suggested, "to prevent incessant strife among men for the possession and retention of women"—the conscious necessity of intertribal peace for social survival—after man had become conscious of the need of a more permanent and satisfactory form than ephemeral marriage?

Certain authors, like McLennan, have attempted to show the evolution of marriage from a state of promiscuity to the modern monogamic marriage. While such a regular order of development does not seem to be firmly established, yet all the forms of marriage from temporary pairing to monogamy have been found in human society. Many of the lower tribes living today have very indefinite family relationships and forms of marriage entirely different from our own, yet it is difficult to assume that all mankind has passed regularly through all these forms of marriage as Spencer seemed to assume in his *Principles of Sociology*. However, if we examine primitive society, we shall find instances of marriage with very little ceremony and, in some cases, a condition approaching promiscuity. At least conditions are found where people mingle rather freely with the minimum of social regulation of their relations. On the other hand, among some of the groups of human beings lowest in the scale of culture, we find arrangements for the care of the child by the group. There are other evidences of the union of a pair for a given time, until the child is born or until he reaches the age of independence

of his mother. Another type of marriage permits the man to live with the woman at his convenience, giving him the right to choose a new mate whenever he pleases. Often, however, this right is subject to rather strict limitations by the wife's relatives. Also the later forms of polygyny and polyandry have been practiced by many tribes or nations at a certain stage of their development. Under certain customs men had the right of choosing more than one wife; under others women had more than one husband. In some instances a group of brothers married a group of sisters. Then in the process of development the system of concubinage sprang up. The elimination of all other forms finally left the marriage of one man to one woman for life,—a form of marriage which we find persisting along with the others from first to last. While it may not be possible to show that all humanity passed regularly through these various stages of matrimonial life, still it is true that the modern pure home life has been the result of an evolution, and that there is a wide difference between primitive and modern marriage.

SECTION 2.

We may thus summarize the various forms of marriage: *A pairing arrangement* of short duration is perhaps the simplest form of family relationships. Such an arrangement is to be found among the Mincopis of the Andaman Islands. The father re-

mains with the mother until the child is weaned. Relations lasting somewhat longer, but still temporary, have been observed among the Australian Aborigines, some of the Indians of Brazil, and the natives of northern Greenland.

Group marriage of a rather peculiar kind has been reported from the Hawaiian Islands. When first discovered by Captain Cook there were found there families made up of a group of brothers married to a group of sisters. Each man was the husband of every woman and each woman was the wife of every man in the family. A similar situation seems to exist among the Todas of India today.

Polyandry, or the family relation in which one woman has more than one husband, has been described most carefully by travelers in Thibet and a section of India. In these two places two distinct types of polyandry have been observed. One or other of these forms with many variations has been observed elsewhere. Giddings has collected testimony showing a similar state of things in Ceylon, although much intermixed with the Thibetan form of polyandry and with polygyny.

Polygyny is a better name than polygamy for that form of the family in which one man has several wives. Polygyny means many wives, while polygamy means many marriages. Polygyny is a term used in contrast with polyandry. In polygyny sometimes the wives are of equal rank ; often, how-

ever, there is one principal wife and several subordinate wives known as concubines.

Monogamy is the term used to designate that form of family life in which one man and one woman form family relations for life. This form has tended to displace the other forms in societies advanced in culture and capable of conscious consideration of the effects of the various forms of family relationships as well as in the less developed societies where economic conditions have made it impossible for a man to support more than one wife.

While for purposes of clearness we have set forth these various types of family as isolated phenomena, in actual life they generally exist side by side. Thus polyandry often is found in bleak and inhospitable regions where men have difficulty in supporting each a family and where the economic conditions have made women of small economic value so that female infants are often killed. Sometimes, however, it probably arose from religious motives. Side by side with it often exist polygyny and monogamy, as in Ceylon, and even in Thibet. Polygyny also is never the only form in any society. It would be impossible to have it universal since the world over, so far as we know, about as many males are born as females. Usually the rich practice it while the poor are monogamous or polyandrous.

SECTION 3.

The development of the sentiment of love within the family has had enormous consequences in the creation and preservation of social order. The propagation of the race has become the foundation of all the finer sentiments of human affection ; the home and the family have fostered and developed love in the human race. While it cannot be said that the family and the home are the only bases for altruistic sentiments and co-operation, the highest developments of altruism have owed more to the family and the home than to any other influences. Remove the sentiments arising out of this idea and the fabric of society would not stand the strain of the savage instincts of mankind. The family relationships have brought to their present development the harmony of feeling, thought, and will which enables people to associate for innumerable purposes. The art of living together profitably and harmoniously has its foundation in the love sentiment brought about by family unity.

It is evident from the foregoing that the family represents the unit of social order. Within it people are trained for the larger social life. Not only are they schooled in the art of producing wealth and trained in the rights of property, but also in the duties and privileges of individuals in association. Here they receive the elements of religious training, for it is in the home that the beginnings of all forms of culture appear. Politically the family and

the state are entirely separated so far as civil rights and duties are concerned, yet the home gives instruction in political life. It is here that questions of public policy are discussed and members of the family receive their early training in political opinion. There was a time in the history of social order when a man became a citizen through his family relationship. Indeed, this is true in some of the Oriental nations like China, where ancient institutions stand like granite. Yet notwithstanding all this the individual gradually has come to have more and more a direct personal relation to the state regardless of family ties or family direction. In the modern democratic society all family relationships have become subordinate to the state so far as civil government is concerned.

CHAPTER X

THE STATE

SECTION I.

When men discuss the origin of the state, some mean the psychological motives which gave birth to the state, while others refer to the institutions out of which the state developed. Representative of the first class is John Morley, when he says that society, by which he must be understood to mean the state, is grounded in "the acceptance of conditions which came into existence by the sociability inherent in man, and were developed by man's spontaneous search after convenience."

Not ignoring the motives which gave rise to the state, but connecting those motives with the institutions in which they found their expression, are other writers, from among whom two representatives may be named. Wilson says, "Government must have had substantially the same early history among all progressive races. It must have begun in clearly defined family discipline." And "What is known of the central nations of history reveals clearly the fact that social organization and, consequently, government (which is the visible form of social organization), originated in *kinship*. The original bond of union and the original sanction for magisterial authority were one and the same thing, name-

ly, real or feigned blood-relationship.”¹ Commons looks to a different series of motives to explain the origin of the state. He says, “The state is the coercitive institution of society. It is not an ideal entity, superimposed upon society, but is an accumulated series of compromises between social classes, each seeking to secure for themselves control over the institution of private property.”² “The state is rather the creature and offspring of private property.”³ Yet the patriarchal family is one of the institutions in which sovereignty and so the state originated, because in that family only do you have the possession of women and children as private property. Thus, according to the writers represented by Wilson the state originated in the relations and institutions of kinship, while according to those represented by Commons it grew out of the institution of private property.

SECTION 2.

The primitive family, or the horde composed of several primitive family groups, was the primordial social group. Naturally out of these simple relationships grew the first attempt at group control. The individual's social relations were within the group; he was connected with his fellows by blood bonds

1 W. Wilson, *The State*, p. 13.

2 J. R. Commons, “*A Sociological View of Sovereignty*,” *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. V, p. 683.

3 *Ibid.* Vol. VI, p. 88.

real or fictitious. In that homogeneous social group we must place the beginnings of control which eventually expressed itself in political government. When the society was metronymic, the mother and her kindred regulated the group. Among tribes in which the patriarchal system prevailed, there was a much stronger organization, the family was more closely integrated, the governed and governing were more clearly separated, and control was much stricter.

In the establishment and maintenance of social order the family frequently performed in a primitive way all the essential duties of the state. As the family multiplied in numbers through adoption and natural increase until it became a great tribe under the direction of the patriarch and chief, it became necessary to establish more elaborate methods of control. It became necessary for him to make certain rulings on new conditions that arose, as well as to carry out the practices and customs of the fathers, and then he became lawgiver. It was his custom also to pass judgment in order to settle the differences between members of the tribal family and thus he became the chief judge of the social group. Moreover, to the help of the patriarch as governor of the group, there was now added the force of the economic motive; he was not only the representative of the gods, but was actually the owner of the women and children and held in trust for the group its common possessions. While later his authority be-

came delegated to other officers, just as the power to legislate eventually passed from the head of the tribe or nation to a body of people selected for that purpose, in this early state of affairs the judicial, legislative, and executive powers of government were all vested in one man, the patriarch of the family. In him, therefore, rested whatever authority existed; and in him we find one historical origin of political control. Here, then, in these primitive kinship organizations we have basic groups, the raw material out of which the state could develop when the new elements of a settled abode and a conqueror enforcing obedience were added—elements introduced by immigration and wars of conquest.

But seldom if ever did a family expand into a tribe and the tribe into a civil unit without an intermixture of races. Once families or clans were well established and population increased, there began a struggle for existence. Tribal warfare brought about the extinction of some clans and the union of others. The union of the conquerors and the conquered occurred on the basis of the slavery of the latter. Sometimes, perhaps, assimilation of one group with another may have been attained by peaceful methods. Much more frequently, if not always, it was conquest that brought about the state. A conquered tribe was reduced to slavery, or at least to an inferior position in the conquering tribe. Then occurred the imposition of the will of the conqueror enforcing obedience by one method or another and

later a compromise as to rights, duties, and privileges, and the regulation of the political status of the members of the united groups. Athens and Rome, among the civilized nations, and the Iroquois, Hopi, Aztecs among the natural races, are examples of federated or united tribes. Many of these tribes passed through successive stages of union with others, each stage being followed by a period of integration. During these successive unions and amalgamations of racial stocks, the duty of the individual to the whole mass became more clearly defined. The growth of the state has been along the line of complete union of discordant racial elements, and full recognition of all classes.

The origin of the state as revealed in the constitution is more easily described. At first the conquering race imposes its will upon the conquered by force. This method of securing obedience yields to others as the relation of sovereignty and obedience continues. Other forms of sovereignty are class sovereignty, which inspires obedience by the power of the mentally and morally superior aided by religion and tradition or exacts obedience through control of wealth; mass sovereignty, or the ability of an emotionally and fanatically unified majority to compel obedience; and general sovereignty, or the power of an enlightened and deliberative community by an appeal to reason and conscience to evoke obedience. With these forms of sovereignty, the civil state comes into existence.

SECTION 3.

In the expansion of the patriarchal family, certain closely related groups called gentes performed the most important services in the formation of political order and law. The gens was composed of families of the same blood organized on the clan basis. Members of the gens had a common religious belief, a common god, and, consequently, a common religious ceremony. They had a common burying ground and held public property in common. There were many customs and a few laws which controlled the gens.

In the development of government marriage was at first a custom, then became an institution. During the process of change from custom to law the heads of the gentes became the advisers of the leader of the tribe, who himself eventually became king. This council of the chief of the tribe finally became the senate, that is, the old men who were capable of advice. Hence, in law or government the heads of the gentes were the most conspicuous of all the individuals of the family group. The settlements of the gentes in some cases became the political units of the new civil state. Moreover, they represented the points of transition from the family life to the state government.

SECTION 4.

Having indicated the early social groups out of which the state developed, let us now inquire what

social forces account for the development of the state from these simpler groups.

One of these forces was religion. In ways to be detailed at length in the next chapter religion helped in the consolidation of heterogeneous elements in an ethnic population by supporting the authority of the patriarch and in early civil society by supporting the iron law of the conqueror. To the fear of stern patriarch or conquering king religion added the fear of the more dreadful spirit of the dead ancestor or of transcendent Deity. In the transition from the tribal life to the state, a national religion was established. Thus, the family religion of certain tribes became the national religion of the Hebrew commonwealth, and so the expanded religion of the Aryan household became the national religion of the Greeks.

Another important influence in the origin and development of the state was the economic motive. After wealth ceased to consist solely of trinkets and arms and came to include flocks and slaves, conquest became desirable for the booty to be obtained thereby. Conquest gave rise to the state, and in all history has continued to have an important influence upon its development.

Still another factor in the origin and development of the state was the expanding consciousness of kind which came about as the size of kindreds grew and contracts within the group were multiplied, and as the number of independent groups increased and

came into contact. Association thus induced kindled the intellectual and emotional nature of mankind, and made possible new pleasures. Then the desire for booty joined hands with the desire for strange wives; these two motives led on to conquest and political development.

With the enlargement of the kinship group there arose a desire for order and for protection among all members of the group. It is beyond the power of one man to regulate, control, and deal justly with a large body of people, as a father deals with his children. The social life becomes too complex for paternalism and so services and functions must be delegated to others. This delegation makes a perpetual differentiation of governmental functions, which differentiation marks the process of state building.

All these influences operated to prepare a group for that ethnic solidarity which is a necessary preliminary to the development of the civil state, and the sovereignty characteristic of civil societies. Much as we may regret to say so, without a doubt the most influential of the forces which resulted in the making of a state was that motive—compounded of the desire for wealth and the desire for power over men—which may be termed the passion for domination which we see coming to expression in the tribal feudalism of the ancient Irish and the Modern Kaffirs. This motive, much tempered in the tribe by the bonds of kinship and restricted by custom and the tradition of the elders, found out-

let and stimulation in the little groups of kinwrecked men gathered about a virile and ambitious leader.

After chieftainship had developed, then followed war and conquest by a migrating people. The stern necessities of war further developed the chieftain, that forerunner of so many important functions in government,—ruler, judge, priest, and capitalist. Out of war and conquest as a first step, grew the assimilation of peoples, which, if not too different in their customs and manners, amalgamated sooner or later, and produced a more plastic-minded people. The larger and more complex developments of statehood grow out of the necessary arrangement made necessary by the inevitable relationship between a conquering and conquered people in close relationships which are new to both. War and conquest are self-limiting and necessarily lead to other things. The conquerors marry, or at least cohabit with, the women of the conquered. A mixed race appears usually with the religion of the mothers, yet not hostile to the ideas and services of the conquerors. Yet the laws which had risen in response to the necessity of regulating the intercourse of the two peoples are not repealed at once. Constantly new laws have to be enacted. Hence, lawmaking becomes a science. Wherever there are new laws and men's lives are regulated by law instead of by custom, there is need for interpretation of those laws and for settling disputes which arise over them. Courts, therefore, come into being under such condi-

tions. Native customs and the customs of the conquerors conflict with each other, and each modifies the other. Language is modified, art develops, ideals clash and coalesce. In every realm of life there goes on modification. The chieftain of the invaders becomes a king, his adherents the body of chief advisers, and the holders of place and power. In these and a thousand other ways a great impetus is given to the constructive imagination of those who have the task of keeping order and holding securely what they have won by the sword.

SECTION 5.

The state is usually defined as a politically organized group occupying a specific territory. By politically organized we mean, of course, having a code of laws and a well-regulated government. It occupies a territory which belongs to it and which it assumes to defend against all others.

But in the modern state there is a growing tendency towards more complete democracy ; hence, in this complex phase of its development we must consider it as a closely integrated collection of individuals and groups having widely different functions. The state today is a socially organized organic group with certain people chosen to control, while others agree to obey. But each individual has a distinctive place and performs a distinctive service. In the modern democracy the state cannot exist apart from the people, and the whole people are organized by

mutual agreement, tacit or expressed, in industry, service, and self-control. In the evolution of the state from the family there have been represented all ideas of government, from the first bare life protection to the establishment of social order, and, in the final instance, to the conscious purpose of securing the social well-being of the whole people. So the state of today represents the conscious, living emanation of the multiple thoughts, sentiments, and will of the people concerning social order and social control, social well-being, and the rights, privileges, and duties of individuals in their relations to one another and to the social group as a whole.

CHAPTER XI

RELIGIOUS LIFE

SECTION I.

It is often said that no people entirely destitute of religion has ever been discovered. And it is true that no people, whose thoughts and practices we have learned to understand adequately, have been without social activities to which the name religion could be applied, provided that name be given a sufficiently wide definition.

The word "religion" has received many definitions. Historically the most characteristic substance of religion has been beliefs concerning relations with unseen powers or beings whether here or hereafter and the emotions and practices elicited by those beliefs. Religion might be defined as those ideas, contemplation of which is found in the experience of any individual or any people to raise life to the highest level, together with the emotions and practices prompted by the contemplation of those ideas. The latter definition, however, would express rather an ideal of the meaning which the word religion may sometimes convey than a description of all the religions that have existed or that still exist; for religions have contained much that debased life, and omitted many of the most ennobling elements in the life of the peoples by whom they were believed.

Religion, far from being a matter of indifference to the "savage," in reality absorbs nearly the whole of life. His daily actions are governed by ceremonial laws of the severest, often of the most irksome and painful character.

The Dyaks of Borneo when they lay out their fields, gather the harvest, go hunting or fishing, contract a marriage, start on a warlike expedition, propose a commercial journey, or anything of importance always consult the gods, offer sacrifices, celebrate feasts, study the omens, obtain talismans, and so on, often thus losing the best opportunity for the business itself. It was a severe shock to the Pueblo Indians to see the white settlers plant corn without any religious ceremony, and a much greater one to see that the corn grew, flourished, and bore abundant crops. Captain Clark, an officer of American army with the widest experience of Indian life, is thus quoted: "It seems a startling assertion, but it is I think true that there are no people who pray more than the Indians. Both superstition and custom keep always in their minds the necessity for placating the anger of the invisible and omnipotent power, and for supplicating the active exercise of his faculties in their behalf." And Brinton says of primitive people that the injunction to "pray always" is nowhere else so nearly carried out.

SECTION 2.

The question of the natural origin of religion was

raised first by the Roman skeptical philosopher-poet, Lucretius, who in his *de Rerum Natura* characterized all belief in gods as an illusion and ascribed its genesis to fear. Hume, in 1755, in his *Natural History of Religion*, took essentially the position of Lucretius, saying that fear of the forces of nature led man to ascribe the phenomena of nature to powerful gods whom he hoped to bring to his side by proper attention such as would avail with persons.

Sir John Lubbock, in his *Origin of Civilization*, published in 1870, has given considerable evidence to show that primitive man personified nature and also that he worshiped the ghosts of ancestors. More than that, he indicated that the worship of the ghosts of ancestors often grew out of his worship of living beings. Indeed, long before that time Comte had a theory of animism. He said, "The theological period of humanity could begin no otherwise than by a complete and usually very durable state of pure fetishism, which allowed free exercise to the tendency of our nature by which man conceived of all external bodies as animated by a life analogous to his own with differences of their intensity." In concluding his argument he said, "Thus fetishism is the basis of the theological philosophy, deifying every substance or phenomenon which attracts the attention of humanity and remaining traceable through all its transformations to the very last."

Edward E. Tylor had a large influence upon the scholars of his time. He developed his theory most completely in his work on *Primitive Culture*. In a word, the theory is that primitive man attributed conscious life like his own to natural phenomena such as trees, stones, rivers, the sky, and the mountains. Seeking a cause for the phenomena that he saw about him, he began, according to Tylor, with the belief that each one was the action of some conscious personality. Knowing nothing about impersonal causes, he attributed to all the striking phenomena of nature a soul or spirit resembling his own. According to Tylor, out of this fact has grown religion. Tylor regarded this form of religion as the earliest type found among men, and traced its development from its inception to its survivals among civilized men. According to this theory, primitive man personified all nature with a spirit much like that which he and his fellows possessed.

Dr. King has suggested a term for the object of religious regard in this stage of man's development, which seems very much better. He denominates it more vaguely "The Mysterious Power." Probably the vagueness of the term corresponds very closely with the vagueness of the idea in the mind of primitive man who held in awe and fear that Something which he did not understand, but of which he was cognizant. Among the Algonquins of North America the term "Manitou" was the synonym for this Something. Many other people, among them

the Japanese, have this same idea of a vague Something pervading the universe.

After a certain stage had been reached, doubtless primitive man began to read into the universe his own experiences and feelings and thoughts. Then he began to personalize nature. Out of that animism arose. It was a crude philosophy and, at the same time, a crude religion.

SECTION 3.

Before leaving the history of the subject, two other writers more recent than any of these mentioned may be cited. One of these, J. Mark Baldwin, approaches the subject of the origin of religion from the standpoint of psychological development; the other, Dr. King, views the origin of religion from the standpoint of group psychology with illustrations from anthropology and sociology.

According to Baldwin, the development of the religious sentiments follows the development of personality. In the development of the child's personality there is opened a facet that reflects other persons. In the interplay of his own personality and that of these other persons in his immediate environment there grows up what Baldwin calls "the ejective personality" or ideal. That is, as he looks upon these other persons, he tends to ascribe to them characteristics and qualities which perhaps they do not possess, but which he feels they should possess. He finds in them some elements of his

ideal. He feels that somewhere there must be a personality which contains all of these elements and characteristics. Consequently, out of this feeling there gradually develops the ideal personality in his own thoughts. On the other hand, just as the real person whom he knows here in life manifests to him attitudes which he does not expect, and yet which, when they are manifested, appeal to him as something better than he has ever thought of, so he comes to feel that this ideal personality will manifest attitudes which he does not expect, and with which he is not prepared to cope. This gives him the sentiments of awe, reverence, and fear. In this way, says Baldwin, the two elements in the religious sentiment develope,—the feeling of dependency and the feeling of mystery. Both are the result of his contact and experience with other persons.

In this same process, or, as Baldwin calls it, "dialectic of personal growth," both in the child and, Baldwin thinks, also in the race, the struggle of the human spirit with physical environment also arouses both the religious sentiment and religious ideas. Whether it be in the child, dreadful of the dark, or in the primitive man, awed by the majestic display of the storm, the trembling of the earthquake, or the belching smoke and fire of the volcano, there is the same consciousness of the awe-inspiring fact pressing itself in upon the mind and stirring both the feeling of dependence and the

feeling of mystery. Here are the feelings out of which may develop religious ideas and religious practices. Both in the child and in the race, says Baldwin, this fearsome stage is characterized chiefly by the sense of mystery and awe, and lasts only so long as these feelings are predominant over thought. When the child, or the primitive man, begins to question the rationale of these and other strange phenomena, ideas arise which may be described as at once philosophical, scientific, and religious.

“What are these mighty forces in comparison with which I am such a pygmy?” thinks the child and the primitive man. “What is their nature; how may I deal with them?” The only cause that either can understand is a personal cause. Therefore, to primitive man, these phenomena must seem to be the effects of personal volitions like those of himself and of his fellows. Consequently, he reads into these phenomena of nature, personality. His conception of this personality will be no different from his conception of other persons. He will interpret it largely in terms of activities and desires. The tumult of the heavens must denote anger, especially since he finds that out of the tumult come death and disaster. Strange mysterious sounds which fill the woods and plains about him must also be caused by beings like himself and his fellows. He personalizes, therefore, every strange, unknown force in nature which he identifies as the

cause of some fear-inspiring phenomenon.

Dr. King approaches the problem from the standpoint of group psychology. He analyzes the evolution of the consciousness of value in the mind of primitive man. Briefly stated, his theory is that the consciousness of value seems to be closely associated with, if not conditioned by, the various active attitudes of persons or groups of persons associated with active life processes developing or modified by social life. Among these are included all complications of activity whether due to chance variations accumulated mechanically, or to conscious adaptation to situations of stress or conflict. The religious attitude, according to King, is simply one phase of the result of the consciousness of value, "a special development of the valuational attitude," as he puts it. Starting from the postulate that the social body has been at least an important factor in the process of the development of valuational attitudes, he argues that many of the so-called highest religious conceptions, like those of God, Freedom, and Immortality, owe their existence to the influence of the social group upon the simpler values. As the atmosphere of the social group was an important aid in the development of language, so social surroundings influenced the development of religion. In general, his theory is that religion grew out of certain activities in which the group was interested, those activities which cluster about the problems and crises which affect the group as a whole. In proof

of this, he cites Robertson Smith, who says that the primitive family thought of their gods as caring only for the tribe and not for the individual. Moreover, only those values which have the sanction of the group would be of permanent value to the individual. In accordance with this theory, therefore, King argues that wherever the social organization of a group is loose and ill defined, there the idea of religion will be indefinite and vague. Furthermore, the religious values of the group and of the individuals supporting it will be very closely connected with the life activities of that group. In groups where the problem of securing food is of serious interest there the religious attitude will be connected with that activity, for example, with the fruiting of the date palm; or it is connected with a water course or a spring upon which the very existence of the group depends. He says, "We may hold that the religious aspects of a people's life are special differentiations of the social order which appear under certain favoring conditions." At the close of harvest, moreover, or the end of a long winter, there is that intensity of feeling in the group that leads to certain functional activities. In the course of time these functional activities come to have religious value, because they bear upon the welfare of the group. Special customs, therefore, and habits of practical value to the welfare of the group often tend to establish themselves as religious practices. As an example he cites the connection

of the care of milk with religious ritual among the Todas. He says that much of the dairy ritual has grown up as a means of counteracting the danger involved in giving the sacred substance milk to peoples whom they regard as inferior beings. This same people, the Todas, have other ceremonies which are directly connected with seasons of stress or of emotional tension. They are distinctly social in character and they may be supposed, says King, to be the outcome of such psychological conditions rather than to have been caused by any original religious motive.

Summing up the discussion of certain of these religious features of Todas and of the Semites, he says, "In other words, the fundamental expedients of the life process, because they are of necessity carried on by groups of people, naturally gained many accretions, from these people's social and play impulses, and these accretions may become of almost more importance than the fundamental acts about which they gather even to the extent of obliterating them." In other words, then, according to King, the accumulation of habits in various directions is one of the first steps in the evolution of Religion. Now on the basis of this development of the consciousness of value in the minds of primitive men King builds his theory of "the Mysterious Power." Belief in this Mysterious Power he holds to be the real significance of the forms of worship as found among primitive men. He believes that

savages conceived it as an impersonal force filling the universe of which they must beware. It was something which they did not understand, and against which they stood on guard, frightened, curious, and fascinated.

SECTION 4.

In summarizing the development of thought concerning the origin of religion up to the present time, we may note that beginning with Lucretius, followed by Hume, we have the general theory of fear,—*Primos in orbe deos fecit timor*. Tylor said that religion originated in fear of the spirit or spirits inhabiting all nature. Spencer specified the form of fear as the fear of the ghosts of ancestors. Baldwin adds the element of reverence developing in the process of growth by reason of the unexpected in other people. Giddings roots the origin of religion in awe of the Great Dreadful. King finds the origin in the psychological development of the consciousness of value growing out of the emotional stress connected with some crisis bearing upon survival. In this evolution of thought there has developed two distinct methods of approach, the one from the standpoint of anthropology, the other from the standpoint of psychology. The significance of King's contribution is that it combines both of these methods of approach and adds still another, namely, the social. These various methods of approach have helped greatly in tracing out the many ways

in which religion has developed. We are certain of this, that religion developed from the interplay of the human mind and the external universe. The phenomena of the universe falls into two categories so far as they affect the human mind. The one is the world of unreasoning nature, and the other is the world of men.

SECTION 5.

What concerns the sociologist most is the influence of religion in the development of social organization. In the first place religion has always been connected with social order. The control of families, tribes, groups, and even nations, has been brought about through religious influence. Religion has lent a powerful sanction to virtue and morality, for it has established the relationship of individuals in the home as well as in matrimonial life. Long before politics and civil law could be established, religion had made the customs that preserved the equilibrium of the social group.

It has always fostered a vague belief in immortality. Whether in its crude form as held by the primitive savage or in its perfected state, it has had more or less influence in the control of human society. In its early form it inspired fear and thus controlled social action, while in its later development the idea of immortality inspires hope and faith and courage,—strong elements, indeed, in the development of man. Again, it has strengthened

patriotic feeling on account of its local character. The religion of the family developed family pride and glory, relating ancestors to gods. When the tribes expanded into a national life the god of the nation led the hosts in battle, preserved their lives and integrity. And thus the idea became an inspiration to patriotic life. In upholding the central authority of the head of the family social order was developed. There was established on one side the governing class, on the other the governed. Thus people learned to rule and to obey, to command and to serve. By surrounding them with formal ceremonies, religion tended to purify the family and other domestic institutions and to preserve the family intact.

On the other hand, in modern times religion has at times been a coercive weapon of reaction, and has opposed the newer developments in society which had for their aim the betterment of society. What aspirations of earnest souls struggling to express a newly discovered truth has it not tried to crush! How often have religious institutions been found on the side of reaction in the struggle for freedom! Even in ancient Israel, as Cornill has remarked, the outcome of the Prophetic religion was to crush the free spirit of the common people and to bind upon them the rites and ideas of the religion of the narrow party of Jerusalem. It paved the way for the priestly domination of the following centuries, and had a share in preparing for the hateful spirit of

the Pharisee. In early Christian times ecclesiasticism crushed the free spirit of the Montanist, drove into ecclesiastical exile that early forerunner of untrammelled thought, the Gnostic, under the leadership of such men as Cyprian and Calixtus narrowed the church to a sect, and bound it with the hard bonds of a party domination. It throttled free inquiry in the Middle Ages, making independent thinking a heresy, and laid the foundation of a revolt which has rent the world into hundreds of warring factions. It forced Galileo to recant his carefully established convictions that the earth moves round the sun, retarded the development of science, threw water upon the flaming aspirations of scholars and stifled the democratic longings of the common people. Clothed with the garments of ecclesiasticism in more recent times men anathematized such truth seekers as Darwin and Huxley and belittled God's records written in the rocks and in the bodies of animals and men. Too often through its well-meaning but benighted representatives, religion has mocked the findings of careful and conscientious scholars, stood with the representatives of arrant wrong against those who in love of the truth have battled for the rights of the people. Nevertheless, such an attitude represents but one side of the work of religion, the conservative side. Even that side is needed in society, as a stabilizing force. One must never forget, moreover, that some of the mightiest revolutions have been inspired by religious

innovators. The Hebrew prophets, Jesus and Paul, Mohammed and Buddah,—who shall say of them and of the movements they inspired that they did not give the race a great impetus toward progressive development?

CHAPTER XII

ART, ORNAMENT, AND DECORATION

SECTION I.

The beautifying of any object is due to impulses which are common to all men, and have existed as far back as the period when men inhabited caves and hunted the reindeer and mammoth in Western Europe. The craving for decorative art having been common to mankind for many thousand years, it would be a very difficult task to determine its actual origin. All we can do is to study the art of the most backward peoples, in the hope of gaining sufficient light to cast a glimmer down the gloomy perspective of the past.

There are certain needs of man which appear to have constrained him to artistic effort; these may be conveniently grouped under the four terms of Art, Information, Wealth, and Religion.

Art.—Æsthetics is the study or practice of art for art's sake, for the sensuous pleasure of form, line, and colour.

Information.—It is not easy to find a term which will express all that should be dealt with in this section. In order to convey information from one man to another, when oral or gesture language is impossible, recourse must be had to pictorial signs of one form or another. It is the history of some of these that

will be dealt with under this term.

Wealth.—It is difficult to distinguish among savages between the love of wealth or power. In more organized societies, power, irrespective of wealth, may dominate men's minds; and it is probable that, whereas money is at first sought after in order to feel the power which wealth can command, later it often degenerates into the miser's greed for gain.

The desire for personal property, and later for enhancing its value, has led to the production of personal ornaments apart from the purely æsthetic tendency in the same direction. There are also emblems of wealth, and besides these, others of power or authority. The practice of barter has led to the fixation of a unit of value, and this in time became represented by symbols—i.e., money.

Religion.—The need of man to put himself into sympathetic relation with unseen powers has always expressed itself in visual form, and it has gathered unto it the foregoing secular triad.

Representation and symbolism convey information or suggest ideas.

Æsthetics brings her trained eye and skilled hand.

Fear, custom, or devotion have caused individual or secular wealth to be directed into other channels, and have thereby entirely altered its character. The spiritual and temporal power and authority of religion has also had immense and direct influence on art.

In a very large number of cases what I have

termed the four needs of man act and react upon one another, so that it is often difficult or impossible to distinguish between them, nor do I profess to do so in every case. It is sufficient for our present purpose to acknowledge their existence and to see how they may affect the form, decoration, or representation of objects.

Having stated the objects for which these representations are made, we must pass to a few other general considerations.

It is probable that *suggestion* in some cases first turned the human mind towards representation. A chance form or contour suggested a resemblance to something else. From what we know of the working of the mind of savages, a mere resemblance is sufficient to indicate an actual affinity. These chance resemblances have occupied a very important place in what has been termed sympathetic magic, and natural objects which suggest other objects are frequently slightly carved, engraved, or painted in order to increase the fancied resemblance. A large number of examples of this can be culled from the writings of missionaries and others, or seen in large ethnographical collections. Mr. H. Balfour has also given one or two interesting illustrations of this process. For example a stone which suggests a human face is noted by a native and the features are slightly emphasised, and ultimately the object may become a fetish or a charm. The mandrake (*Mandragora*) is very important in sympathetic magic, and its

human attributes have been suggested by the two roots which diverge from a common underground portion, and which recall the body and legs of a man; a slight amount of carving will considerably assist nature and a vegetable man results.

Suggestion does not operate only at the inception of a representation or design, but it acts continuously, and may at various times cause strange modifications to occur.

Expectancy, as Dr. Colley March has pointed out, has been a very important factor in the history of art. This is intimately connected with the association of ideas. If a particular form or marking was natural to a manufactured object, the same form and analogous marking would be given to a similar object made in a different manner, and which was not conditioned by the limitations of the former.

We may regard suggestion and expectancy as the dynamic and static forces operating on the arts of design; the former initiates and modifies, the latter tends to conserve what already exists.

It is the play between these two operations which gives rise to what may be termed a distinctive "*life-history*" of artistic representations.

A life-history consists of three periods: birth, growth, death. The middle period is one which is usually marked by modifications which may conveniently be grouped under the term of evolution, as they imply a gradual change or metamorphosis, or even a series of metamorphoses.

SECTION 2.

For our present purpose we may recognise three stages of artistic development—origin, evolution, and decay.

The vast bulk of artistic expression owes its birth to realism; the representations were meant to be life-like, or to suggest real objects; that they may not have been so was owing to the apathy or incapacity of the artist or to the unsuitability of his materials.

Once born, the design was acted upon by constraining and restraining forces which gave it, so to speak, an individuality of its own. In the great majority of representations the life-history ran its course through various stages until it settled down to uneventful senility; in some cases the representation ceased to be—in fact it died.

It will be found that the decorative art of primitive folk is directly conditioned by the environment of the artists: and in order to understand the designs of a district, the physical conditions, climate, flora, fauna, and anthropology, all have to be taken into account; thus furnishing another example of the fact that it is impossible to study any one subject comprehensively without touching many other branches of knowledge.

All human handiwork is subject to the same operation of external forces, but the material on which these forces act is also infinitely varied. The diverse races and people of mankind have different ideas

and ideals, unequal skill, varied material to work upon, and dissimilar tools to work with. Everywhere the environment is different. So we get that bewildering confusion of ideas which crowd upon us when inspecting a large ethnographical collection or a museum of the decorative arts.

The conclusion that forces itself upon us is that the decorative art of a people does, to a certain extent, reflect their character. A poor, miserable people have poor and miserable art. Even among savages leisure from the cares of life is essential for the culture of art. It is too often supposed that all savages are lazy, and have an abundance of spare time, but this is by no means always the case. Savages do all that is necessary for life; anything extra is for excitement, or religion; and even if there is abundance of time for these latter, it does not follow that there is an equivalent superfluity of energy. The white man, who has trained faculties and overflows with energy, is apt to brand as lazy those who are not so endowed. In the case of British New Guinea it appears pretty evident that art flourishes where food is abundant. One is perhaps justified in making the general statement that the finer the man the better the art, and that the artistic skill of a people is dependent upon the favourableness of their environment.

The relation of art to ethnology is an important problem. So far as our information goes, it appears that the same processes operate on the art of deco-

ration whatever the subject, wherever the country, whenever the age—another illustration of the essential solidarity of mankind. But there are, at the same time, numerous and often striking idiosyncrasies which have to be explained. Many will be found to be due to what may be termed the accidents of locality. Natural forms can only be intelligently represented where they occur, and the materials at the disposal of the artist condition his art.

It will often be found that the more pure or the more homogeneous a people are, the more uniformity will be found in their art work, and that florescence of decorative art is a frequent result of race mixture. For although prolific art work may be dependent, to some extent, upon leisure due to an abundance of food, this will not account for artistic aptitude, though in process of time the latter may be a result of the employment of the leisure ; still less will it account for the artistic motives or for the technique.

The art of a people must also be judged by what they need not do and yet accomplish. The resources at their command, and the limitations of their materials, are very important factors ; but we must not, at the same time, ignore what they would do if they could, nor should we project our own sentiment too much into their work. In this, as in all other branches of ethnographical inquiry, we should endeavour to learn all we can about them from their own point of view before it is too late. At the present stage knowledge will not be advanced much by looking

at laggard peoples through the spectacles of old-world civilization.

SECTION 3.

We have heard tell of races to whom clothing is unknown; but it must be said that the few cases of this for which there is good evidence are exceptions that have arisen under such special conditions as only to establish the rule. If, however, we are to discover the principles which underlie the usage generally, the first thing required is to come to an understanding as to what we mean by clothing. It is surely impossible to designate mere ornament as clothing; among tribes in tropical countries the motive of protection against cold entirely disappears, and of all the superfluity of our northern apparel, nothing remains save what is required by decency. One need hardly discuss the question whether there is any thought of simply *protecting* the parts concealed. If it were a question of protection, the feet and ankles would surely be sooner covered. What is most decisive is the observed fact that clothing stands in unmistakable relation to the sexual life, and that the first to wear complete clothes is not the man who has to dash through the bush in hunting, but the married woman. This gives us the primary cause of wrappings, which must have arisen when the family was evolved from the unregulated intercourse of the horde,—when the man began to assert a claim to individual and definite women. He

it was who compelled the woman to have no dealings with other men, and to cover herself as a means of diminishing her attractions. As a further step in this direction may be noted the veiling of the bosom. From this root, the separation of the sexes, sprang the feeling of modesty; this developed powerfully, and clothing with it. It was a great stride; since the more confined and more destitute the life of a tribe is, the less inducement is given to a rigid separation of the sexes with its attendant jealousy; and the more readily do they dispense with the troublesome covering, of which scanty fragments alone remain. Thus it is always the smallest, most degraded, most out-of-the-way tribes among whom we more especially find no mention of customary clothing; such as some Australian races, the extinct Tasmanians, some forest tribes of Brazil, and here or there a negro horde. Even with them survivals of dress are not wanting. When clothing was more complete, the woman gained immensely in charm, esteem, and social position, so that she had every reason to keep up her wardrobe.

It is quite otherwise with the portion of the dress intended directly to protect the body. In all places we find the shoulder-covering in the shape of a cloak. Tropical tribes use it primarily to keep off the rain, while in colder climates it serves for warmth and also as a sleeping-cover. These cloak-like articles of clothing are far less widely diffused than those which serve for decency; which also proves

that the latter were the first clothing worn by men.

Another circumstance undoubtedly has contributed to develop the sense of modesty, as Karl von den Steinen has pointed out. As the wild beast drags his prey into the thicket, in order to devour it undisturbed, so some tribes think it highly indecorous to look at any one eating ; and the same may have held good in regard to other functions. But this is not the only feeling which the simple man is endeavouring to satisfy when he clothes his body. Next to it stands the gratification of vanity. The former motive, as a mere injunction of custom, is quickly done with ; the other is sought to be attained at any cost. One may say without exaggeration that many races spend the greater part of their thought and their labour on the adornment of their persons. These are in their own sphere greater fops than can be found in the highest civilization. The traders who deal with these simple folk know how quickly the fashion changes among them, as soon as a plentiful importation of varied stuffs and articles of ornament takes place. The natural man will undergo any trouble, any discomfort, in order to beautify himself to the best of his power.

Modesty in the woman is especially apt to take on a touch of coquetry, for an example of which we need look no further than the low-necked dresses of the ball-rooms of the civilized peoples. In this way what was once an article essential to decency imperceptibly approximates more and more to orna-

ment by the addition of fringes, or, as among the Fans and some of the Congo tribes, by the attachment of strings of jingling bells. Even more grotesque combinations of concealment and parade may be observed; especially where there is a religious motive for the former.

SECTION 4.

Ornament and distinction again go hand in hand, though for this brilliancy and costliness are not always necessary. In East and Central Africa the chiefs wear arm and leg-rings made from the hair of the giraffe's tail; in West Africa, caps from the hide of a particular antelope; while in Tonga, necklaces of the cachalot or sperm-whale's teeth serve at once for ornament, distinction, and money—perhaps also for amulets. It is quite intelligible that in the lower grades of civilization, where even great capitalists can carry their property on their persons, ornament and currency should be interchangeable. There is no safer place—none where the distinction conferred by wealth can be more effectively displayed—than the owner's person. Hence the frequency with which we find forms of currency which may at the same time serve for ornament, cowries, *dentalium*, and other shells, cachalots' teeth, iron and copper rings, coins with a hole through them. Silver and gold currencies have grown up in the same way; but among the barbarous races of the older world, only the Americans seem to have

appreciated the value of gold. It was left for Europeans to discover the great stores of this metal in Australia, California and Africa. To this day in the districts of Famaka and Fadasi, although almost every torrent brings down gold, it plays no part in native ornament or trade.

Lastly, we may reflect how eloquent for a savage is the silent language of bodily mutilation and disfigurement. As Théophile Gautier says: "Having no clothes to embroider, they embroider their skins." Tattooing serves for a tribal or family mark; it often indicates victorious campaigns, or announces a lad's arrival at manhood, and so also do various mutilations of teeth and artificial scars. Radiating or parallel lines of scars on cheek or breast, such as the Australians produce with no other apparent object save that of ornament, denote among the Shillooks, Tibboos, and other Africans, the loss of near kindred. Even if we cannot see in circumcision, or the amputation of a finger, any attempt at personal embellishment, in these and similar practices it is difficult to separate with a hard-and-fast line the motives of decoration, distinction, and fulfilment of a religious or social precept. Doubtless much of the ornamentation which is applied to the body is a mode of expressing the primitive artistic impulse, upon which special attention is bestowed; and thus the tattooings of the New Zealanders, often the work of years to execute, and that at the cost of much labour and pain, must be reckoned among

the most conspicuous achievements of the artistic sense and dexterity of that race. The Indians are less distinguished in this respect, while among the Negroes few devote so much attention to this branch of art as to the arrangement of their hair—a point in which they certainly surpass all races, being materially aided in this task by the stiff character of their wigs.

As in all primitive industries, we meet here, as a characteristic phenomenon, with endless variations on a limited theme. Thus some races take to painting, some to tattooing, some again to hairdressing. Customs affecting the same region of the body may often indicate relationships. Thus the Batokas knock out their upper front teeth, causing the lower to project and push out the under lip. Their neighbours to the eastward, the Manganyas, wear a plug in their upper lip, often in the lower, and thereby arrive at a similar disfigurement. These luxuriant developments of the impulse for ornament exhibit the innate artistic sense of a race often in an astonishing phase, and it is not without interest to trace it from its crudest beginnings. The articles which savages use for ornament are calculated to show up against their dark skins. White shells, teeth, and such like, produce a very different effect on that background to what they offer on our pale hands or in dark cabinets. Hence we find far and wide painting with red and white—cosmetics were among the objects buried with their dead by the old Egyp-

tians—dressing of the dark hair with white lime and similar artifices. But the highest summit of the art has been attained by the Monbuttus, who, in the great variety of patterns with which they paint their bodies, avoid harsh colours and elementary stripes and dots. The old people alone leave off adorning themselves and let the painting wear out; but it is at this age that the indelible tattooing begins to be valuable.

Among the other advantages enjoyed by the male sex is that of cultivating every kind of adornment to a greater extent, and devoting more time to it. In the lowest groups of savages ornament follows the rule which is almost universal among the higher animals; the male is the more richly adorned. As is well known, civilization has pretty well reversed this relation, and the degree of progress to which a race has attained may to some extent be measured by the amount of the sacrifice which the men are prepared to make for the adornment of their women. Otherwise, in the most civilized communities, men only revert to the custom of adorning themselves when they happen to be soldiers or attendants at court.

SECTION 5.

A practical result of the tendency to luxury in the midst of destitution is the confinement of trade with the "natural" races to a small list of articles, the number of which is almost entirely limited by the pur-

poses of ornament or pastime and sensual enjoyment. Of trade in the great necessities of food and clothing there is hardly any. The objects exchanged, things of value and taste, are primarily luxuries. Setting aside the partly civilized inhabitants of the coast, and the European colonies, the important articles of the African trade are beads, brass wire, brass and iron rings, spirits, tobacco. The only articles in a different category which have attained to any importance are cotton goods and firearms.

Finally we may find a place in this section for those implements of the toilet wherewith all those works of art are performed upon which primitive man, in this respect nowise behind his civilized brother, bases his hope of pleasing and conquering. Let us hear how Schweinfurth describes the dressing case of a Bongo lady: "For pulling out eyelashes and eyebrows they make use of little tweezers. Peculiar to the women of the Bongos are the curious little elliptical knives fitted into a handle at both ends, sharpened on both edges, and decorated with tooling in many patterns. These knives the women use for all their domestic operations, especially for peeling tubers, slicing cucumbers and gourds, and the like. Rings, bells of different kinds, clasps, and buttons, which are struck into holes bored in their lips and ear lobes; with lancet-shaped hairpins, which seem necessary for parting and dividing their plaits, complete the Bongo lady's dressing-case." A pair of tweezers for thorns, in a case attached to the

dagger-sheath, forms part of the outfit in almost all parts of Africa. Many carry a porcupine's bristle or an ivory pin stuck into the hair to keep it smooth. Combs are well known to the Polynesians, the Arctic races and the Negroes.

SECTION 6.

By means of poetry, eloquence, painting, sculpture, music, and its various other forms, art has power to control man through the domination of his feelings. When men must be quickly fused into a living unity, the emotions are always appealed to; and nothing moves the emotions like art. Take, for example, the Psalm-singing of Cromwell's Ironsides and the songs of the German soldiery as they marched to the front in the great war. Art, moreover, arouses social sympathy. It is like play, which really began as an art; for, by exciting their emotions it loosens the restraints which separate men and it binds them together by a common feeling. Its appeal is universal; the sentiments which it arouses are common to all men. It is used in war, in religion, and in the establishment of a new order of things. Everywhere is the æsthetic sense exploited in the interests of society. Saints and heroes are painted with beatific countenances, while devils and their human disciples are given the most detestable forms. And whereas moral excellence is described in such æsthetic terms as to make the quality intelligible and desirable to all, antisocial conduct,

on the other hand, is stigmatised by adjectives and pictured in colors which are associated with the undesirable things of everyday life.

There is still another way in which art fastens upon our common longings and converts them to social purposes. The soul oppressed with the pettiness, the brevity, and the insufficiency of life's endeavors is given hope for the fulfillment of its vast desires; for art points to the stability of the nation, the immutability of the group, and the mightiness of the human race. All may be fleeting, so far as the individual is concerned; but the lofty buildings, the vast territory, or the achievements of a state give to the individual a sense of security and permanence.

Another thing that art does for us is to glorify our social symbols. The flag becomes a thing of great beauty and the splendor of precious metals and jewels is used to draw men's attention from the suffering and self-abnegation of the individual for the sake of the group. War, missions, and individual sacrifices for public service are all thus glorified. Again, art pictures the worker as the happiest of all men. He is "God's nobleman," the "bulwark of the state"; and his pains and deprivations are "heroic joys." The nation for which he is asked to die, or to live through days of painful toil, is a fair maiden or matron appealing to the deepest and strongest feelings in man, the emotions stirred by thought of wife, sweetheart, or mother. Thus, na-

tional types like the Gibson girl in physical appearance spring up and moral types like that of Christian in *Pilgrim's Progress*. Thus the artist fascinates our imaginations with new types of conduct to which we naturally may be alien and pictures saint and hero in such a way that they become models to which we are irresistibly drawn. Thus does art lure men on to the great and noble deeds from which they naturally recoil, yet which are so necessary for society's welfare.

CHAPTER XIII

CONCLUSION :

THE TENDENCY IN SOCIAL EVOLUTION

The evolution of social activities tends to show three stages, in the first of which social activity is defined by instinct and biological necessity, in the second of which social activity breaks those definite bounds and enters upon a career of random vagaries, in the third of which the modes of social activity again become more definitely systematic, being defined by reason in the light of past experience ; and there is a marked resemblance between the social activities of the first stage which are defined by instinct and biological necessity and those of the third stage which are defined by reason, the latter however being carried on with immensely developed resources, and upon a far higher plane. Thus the course of social evolution is like a spiral stairway of many broken steps, which traverses one complete circle to reach a landing directly above the starting-point, but on a far higher level.

1. The family, so far as evidence justifies an opinion, had originally a form that was forced upon it by instinct and biological necessity, namely, primitive pairing. The family passed through a second period of random experimentation with every conceivable vagary. Finally it settled again to a uni-

form and regular type which is the product of natural social selection and racial experience, as comprehended by reason. And this form, adopted by reason, is monogamy, bearing a close resemblance to the supposed primitive pairing.

2. The position of woman was at first equal to that of man. The family was matronymic, and the deities of primitive folk were quite as likely to be goddesses as gods. But with respect to the position of woman social usages passed into a long period of random vagaries in which under many forms appeared one general characteristic, namely, the subjection of woman. There is however a tendency for advanced societies to enter a third stage with respect to the general treatment of woman, a stage which does not arrive until some time after the monogamous family has been firmly established as the social norm. In this third stage there is a strong tendency for experience and reason to suppress the endless ingenuities of feminine subjection and restore her to the social equality which she originally enjoyed.

3. Politically the savage is the freest of men. But soon political development enters a second stage characterized by endless forms of conquest, slavery, serfdom, villenage and finally more moderate forms of tyranny. Even in comparatively recent times the rank and file of English "freemen" were not free to come and go, to choose and pursue their callings, and to express in untrammelled action

their beliefs; and their participation in the affairs of the state of which they were members was comparatively slight. Only of late, and in the most advanced nations, has reason made civic equality a matter to be granted without avowed opposition and asserted a claim to a political equality like that which upon a lower plane was enjoyed by savages.

4. Prestige, probably the most powerful factor in social organization, which by its particular type gives color and character to all the customs and institutions of a society, is at first based upon personal qualities, those qualities which most awaken instinctive admiration and self-subordination, particularly prowess, and above all prowess displayed in the defense or aggrandizement of the group. But presently the prestige of personal prowess degenerates into caste, and later wealth becomes the chief foundation for social eminence. But there are already signs that here also reason will assert itself and reestablish personal qualities as the basis of prestige, not those qualities of personal prowess which most strongly appeal to instinct, but those qualities of character and achievement which appeal to reason. As Spencer was the great spokesman of the transition from militarism to industrialism so Veblen may be regarded as a spokesman of the transition from the social ideals of industrial individualism to those of social service.

5. The economic life of society at first was in a

large degree communistic and secured a fair distribution of food; none could starve while others waxed fat. But the second stage, that of random vagaries, allows great disparities in wealth and poverty, and so organizes the control of society as to render those disparities largely self-perpetuating and self-intensifying. But there is some justification for the belief that reason will so assert itself as to restore, not instinctive communism and economic equality, but a rational distribution of wealth and of economic opportunity, and universal supply of the necessities for a decent standard of living among all normal members of society.

6. The earliest economic organization is not individualistic but co-operative practically always where there is an enterprise large enough to call for co-operation. During the period of random vagaries the principle of co-operation in the interest of all the participants in industry is lost to view. Finally, if reason, which regards all the facts and interests involved, ever molds our industrial order, it may succeed in establishing an industrial system more democratic in its aims and even in the method of its direction and control.

7. Morality is originally instinctive, the expression of sympathy, altruism, and partisanship in personal relations within the group. But morality also has its period of random vagaries, in which relations are formed between individuals and classes in which the instinctive controls do not function; and exploi-

tation, and cruelty are practiced with no protest from the social instincts. But moral evolution through the rational interpretation of experience, by the folk-sense, and the insight of the élite, defines and extends the application of ethical sentiments until morality establishes over the extended relationships of civilized society a control which is as definite and, in its applications if not in its strength, as adequate to the needs of the case as the instinctive good nature that prevails within a savage horde.

8. Peace within the primitive group is established by the social instincts. Savages are not savage to their own clans-folk. But during the second period, the period of evolution, through random experiment and natural selection, in this case very long, inter-group relations play a great rôle, and in these relations the social instincts provide no basis for order. The establishment of group expectations and inter-group conventions that shall serve for the maintenance of inter-group order is perhaps the most difficult social task of reason. But if reason ever has its way in this sphere of human action it will extend the application of ethical sentiments to international relations, as it has done and still is doing with reference to the wider and more impersonal relations within the group; then group peace will extend so as to include the brotherhood of humanity.

9. Crime, or infraction of the group code of

custom or of formal law, at first is treated with severity dictated by instinctive vengeance. Later sentimentality, the realization that the criminal is often the victim of unfortunate heredity and social environment, and a clutter of legal provisions intended to qualify the evil of ancient usages that society could not make up its mind entirely to abolish, largely replaced the prompt certainty of instinctive vengeance with weakness and delay and uncertainty. In the third stage of development reason will seek to restore the swiftness and certainty and necessary severity of the law, together with intelligent discrimination between the treatment demanded by the individual character of criminals. Thus the prompt efficiency of instinct, which in the second stage is bewildered by new conditions and groping reason, in the third stage would be replaced by a promptness and efficiency dictated by the definite conclusions of maturer knowledge.

10. The daily life of the savage "is a ritual." Among barbarians the details of conduct, the forms of everyday objects, and the character of dress and ornament are dictated by long-established custom. In the second or mutating period of social evolution the more superficial aspects of common things and ways are subject to a perfect riot and dissolution of successive fashions. But after the possibilities of invention have been somewhat exhausted, fashions have repeated themselves in cycles, rational eclecticism has identified the most practical, and developed

canons of taste have recognized the most beautiful, we may replace the constant meaningless changes of fashion by a new custom era. It will not be rigid and bigoted custom, it will allow for variety according to personal convenience and taste, but will avoid the colossal wastes of fashion, and will preserve chosen forms, instead of an endless succession of forms that have no claim to superiority to justify their existence.

11. Simplicity characterizes the practical arts and the conduct of life among primitive peoples, a simplicity which results partly from poverty of ideas and partly from practical directness of method dictated by necessity. After the period of extreme and ever-increasing complexity, it may be that there will be restored to life a simplicity which is rational and due to the choice of the best out of many offered modes of action; as the analytic languages largely escape from the intricacies of inflection, and as modern Roman type sloughing off the flourishes of mediæval copyists and engravers returns to a form closely resembling the simplicity of the first Phœnician alphabet.

12. The intellectual life of early man is fixed and established in tradition and authority. The second stage of social development is full of intellectual uncertainty. Every thinker speculates for himself. Systems of philosophy clash and though many are convinced, they are convinced without general agreement. But as science removes one

problem after another from the realm of speculation and adds its solution to the body of our knowledge, and education popularizes these results, although from the intellectual elevation reached we may see upon the wide horizon of our knowledge more unsettled problems than ever appeared before, yet we shall have a basis of relative certainty and general agreement, not the dogmatic certainty of ignorant tradition, but a substantial island of firm common standing ground in the ocean of the unknown.

13. That effect of biological necessity which is termed "natural selection" undoubtedly plays its part vigorously among the population of little developed societies. But later it is thwarted by scientific methods of prolonging the life of the feeble. A large proportion of civilized women would die in their first attempt at motherhood if under savage conditions. In a variety of ways civilization appears to be counter-selective. But here again reason is seeking to step in and to apply scientific knowledge in a eugenic program. And though natural selection no longer gives us a highly selective death rate, eugenics may do something toward giving us a selective birth rate. The very fact that the most intelligent and idealistic will be most affected by the agitation to establish a genestic conscience may secure an increase in the proportion of births from such parents.

Such considerations will have interest rather than solid value, unless they are strictly confined to trac-

ing a tendency which can be discerned in the facts of the present and the past. There is no science, in the complete sense of that word, without explanation; and there is no explanation except causal explanation. But causal explanation does not mean ultimate metaphysical explanation, which to man is inaccessible; it means tracing the relation of the phenomena to be explained to the phenomena by which they were conditioned. Social science, including sociological ethics, if it is to adopt the scientific method, if it is to proceed, not by *a priori* speculation but by the investigation of facts, is forced to be a sort of "natural" science, a science, that is to say, that has for its business the explanation of a special class of facts that constitute its problems, by reference to other facts as their causes or conditions.



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